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Abstract
Toward Effective Access Control Using Attributes and Pseudoroles
Suhair Alshehri
Supervising Professor: Rajendra K. Raj
Sharing of information is fundamental to modern computing environments across
many application domains. Such information sharing, however, raises security
and privacy concerns that require effective access control to prevent unauthorized
access and ensure compliance with various laws and regulations. Current ap-
proaches such as Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC) and their variants are inadequate. Although it provides simple
administration of access control and user revocation and permission review, RBAC
demands complex initial role engineering and makes access control static. ABAC,
on the other hand, simplifies initial security setup and enables flexible access con-
trol, but increases the complexity of managing privileges, user revocation and user
permissions review. These limitations of RBAC and ABAC have thus motivated
research into the development of newer models that use attributes and policies
while preserving RBAC’s advantages.
This dissertation explores the role of attributes—characteristics of entities in the
system—in achieving effective access control. The first contribution of this disser-
tation is the design and development of a secure access system using Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). The second contribution is the de-
sign and validation of a two-step access control approach, the BiLayer Access Con-
trol (BLAC) model. The first layer in BLAC checks whether subjects making access
iii
requests have the right BLAC pseudoroles—a pseudorole is a predefined subset of
a subject’s static attributes. If requesting subjects hold the right pseudoroles, the
second layer checks rule(s) within associated BLAC policies for further constraints
on access. BLAC thus makes use of attributes effectively while preserving RBAC’s
advantages. The dissertation’s third contribution is the design and definition of
an evaluation framework for time complexity analysis, and uses this framework
to compare BLAC model with RBAC and ABAC. The fourth contribution is the
design and construction of a generic access control threat model, and applying it
to assess the effectiveness of BLAC, RBAC and ABAC in mitigating insider threats.
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Information sharing is a basic requirement of modern computing environments
in many application domains ranging from healthcare to financial services. Al-
though sharing of information provides several advantages, it raises privacy con-
cerns, particularly when personally identifiable information is involved. That is,
such information could potentially identify real-life individuals [55].
Many privacy acts and regulations, including the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), im-
pose stringent requirements on handling the protection of such identifiable infor-
mation. Authentication, access control, and auditing are among the key require-
ments in such acts and regulations [91]. Although all of these features are funda-
mental and vital to information and system security, this dissertation focuses on
effective access control models.
An access control model is typically designed to protect data from (1) unautho-
rized or improper use and disclosure (confidentiality), and (2) unauthorized or im-
proper modification and destruction (integrity). Such protection can be achieved
by ensuring that decisions for access requests by subjects (users) for protected ob-




An access control model is conceptually composed of two main components: (1)
an enforcement mechanism (or an implementation of a reference monitor), and (2)
a decision function. The enforcement mechanism intercepts and examines each
access request. It consults with the decision function whether the access request
complies with the security policies or not to permit or deny it. The process of
making access-control decisions may involve the identity of the data owners, role
played by subjects in an organization or a set of identifiable attributes associated




















Figure 1.1: A generic access control model, showing the two main components: an enforce-
ment mechanism and a decision function.
1.1 Problem Description
Approaches to access control including Discretionary Access Control model (DAC)
[75], Mandatory Access Control model (MAC) [62], Role-Based Access Control
model (RBAC) [73] and Attribute-Based Access Control model (ABAC) [84] are
inadequate, as explained in the following paragraphs. In DAC, access decisions
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are set according to the discretion of owners based on the identity of subjects and
objects. On the other hand, in MAC, a system controls access to objects and owners
cannot override the controls based on security labels attached to subjects and ob-
jects. A label on an object is called a security classification, while a label on a user is
called a security clearance. DAC and MAC have several limitations including the
lack of scalability and dynamic adaptability to the changes of security policies [12].
In RBAC, access to objects is based on subjects’ roles or their job functions. In
the education setting, for example, a subject may hold the role ”Instructional Fac-
ulty.” RBAC is widely deployed for its simplicity of administering permissions for
large number of users. On the other hand, it is known for its difficulty of defining
and structuring roles and inflexibility in dynamically changing environments as it
supports coarse-grained and predetermined access control due to the use of roles
and the assignments of roles to subjects. RBAC is defined and described in further
detail in Chapter 2.
The use of attributes—characteristics of entities to describe and identify them
from all others such as name, date of birth, and job title—helps to support finer
granularity in access control. Thus, instead of defining access privileges in terms
of externally-defined roles, attributes of subjects can be used to specify targeted
access rules. The concept of attributes in access control models has been extended
to describe objects and environment conditions in addition to subjects’ properties.
Here is an example from the education domain of three access rules with three
different levels of granularity to demonstrate the power of the fine-granularity pro-
vided by the use of attributes in defining access-control rules:
1. Coarse: Faculty members are allowed to open the department office door.
2. Fine: Faculty members in the Computer Science department are allowed to
open the department office door.
3
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3. Finer: Faculty members in the Computer Science department are allowed to
open the department office door during office hours if they are assigned to
that office.
Thus, as more attributes are included in access-control rules, the more speci-
fied and targeted the access rules are going to be. In short, attributes allow for
extremely fine-grained access control.
ABAC, which is based on attributes, is a relatively recent yet promising ac-
cess control model [27, 84], which employs attributes and access policies to de-
fine privileges of subjects. In ABAC, access requests compared against attributes
within these policies to determine whether to allow or deny access requests. ABAC
overcomes the RBAC problem of defining and structuring roles as it (ABAC) uses
attributes for making access-control decisions. Because ABAC uses attributes, it
supports fine-grained access control policies that can be evaluated dynamically in
real-time, and are flexible enough to support environments with frequently chang-
ing user permissions.
Here is another example from the education domain to demonstrate the flexibil-
ity provided by the use of attributes in access control. A faculty member works in a
college and he is defined with a set of attributes. One of these attributes is <Job Ti-
tle, Instructional Faculty>. His access privileges in ABAC stem from such attributes,
not from the notion of a single role (as in RBAC). So assuming this faculty mem-
ber gets promoted to department chair, the faculty member’s access privileges will
need to be updated accordingly.
In ABAC, this change requires only a simple modification to the value of the
attribute job title from <Job Title, Instructional Faculty> to <Job Title, Department
Chair>. The faculty is immediately able to access all the information needed to
perform the new chair duties. No adjustments to existing access policies or rules




ABAC, however, is more cumbersome in terms of the number of rules that need
to be evaluated for access-control decisions. For n attributes, ABAC may require
up to 2n possible rules. Also, management of privileges and permission review
for a particular user are difficult to perform as a large set of rules must be exe-
cuted [37].
Table 1.1 describes how access-control decisions are evaluated in the access con-
trol models discussed previously. In MAC and DAC, for example, access-control
decisions are respectively based on security labels of subjects and objects, and
identities of subjects. In RBAC, access-control decisions are made based on the
mapping between subjects and roles, and roles and permissions. In ABAC, access-
control decisions are evaluated using attributes.
Table 1.1: Decision Evaluation in access control models. Access-control decisions in MAC,
DAC, RBAC and ABAC are made respectively according to security labels of subjects and
objects, identities of subjects, assignments of subjects to roles and roles to permissions, and
attributes.
Model U SL R A Permission Mapping
MAC 0 1 0 0 SL→ Permission
DAC 1 0 0 0 U→ Permission
RBAC 1 0 1 0 U→ R→ Permission
ABAC 0 0 0 1 A1,. . . ,An → Permission
U=User; SL=Security Label; R=Role; A=Attribute
Due to the limitations of both RBAC and ABAC, research therefore is needed
to understand how attributes could be used effectively in designing newer access
control models to improve the process of making access-control decisions. This
dissertation first examines the use of attributes and policies in Ciphertext-Policy
5
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Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [13]. In CP-ABE, subjects’ private keys are
labeled with sets of attributes and objects are encrypted and associated with ac-
cess structures or rules consisting of AND and OR gates. A subject’s private key
can decrypt a particular encrypted object or ciphertext only if the attribute set of
the subject’s key satisfies the access rule associated with the ciphertext. Details
about this approach and its viability for effective access control are presented in
Chapter 3.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [37] recently called
for the development of a policy-enhanced RBAC model that includes the use of
attributes while maintaining the advantages of RBAC. Three possible mechanisms
were identified: (1) dynamic roles, in which attributes are used to dynamically as-
sign roles to subjects, (2) attribute centric, in which roles are defined as another
attribute of subjects, and (3) role centric, in which attributes are used to constrain
the permissions assigned to roles.
These suggested approaches also suffer drawbacks. The first approach inherits
all limitations of RBAC including the lack of granularity and dynamic adaptabil-
ity. The second approach discards all the advantages of RBAC and inherits all the
disadvantages of ABAC. The third approach lacks the flexibility of ABAC because
the maximum permission sets are constrained by the use of roles.
Given the likely impact of a solution to this call by NIST, the dissertation ex-
amines how attributes could be used effectively in designing newer access control
models while preserving RBACs advantages. Toward achieving this goal, the dis-
sertation proposes a new variant to RBAC and ABAC, the BiLayer Access Control
(BLAC) model [7]. The design of the BLAC model is inspired by several aspects of
CP-ABE, including the association of private keys and attributes and ciphertexts
and access structures. The complete definition and description of the BLAC model




The major objective of this dissertation has been the exploration of attributes and
policies for the design of effective access control models. As a consequence, the
contributions of this dissertation span several distinct yet related issues around
access control space as listed below.
• This dissertation shows how attributes and policies in CP-ABE [13] can ad-
dress observed inadequacies of current approaches to access control and stan-
dard encryption techniques, through the design and development of a cloud-
based system for electronic health records (EHRs) as described in Alshehri [6].
Specifically, the dissertation shows that CP-ABE provides promising perfor-
mance to enforce access control in information sharing environments.
• The dissertation addresses the problem of improving access control via the
use of attributes for making access-control decisions while retaining the ad-
vantages of RBAC. As a result, the dissertation proposes the design and vali-
dation of the BLAC model, which is described in Alshehri [7]. Unlike current
access control approaches, the BLAC model uses the concept of pseudoroles
and performs access control in a two-step evaluation procedure. A pseudorole
is informally defined as a set of values of static attributes of subjects. That is, a
pseudorole is not a real role as traditionally defined in RBAC. The first layer
in the two-step evaluation process checks access requests to verify whether
requesting subjects have the right pseudoroles specified in the BLAC policies
of the requested objects. If requesting subjects hold the right pseudoroles, the
second layer checks rule(s) within the associated BLAC policies for additional
constraints on access.
• This dissertation designs and defines an evaluation framework that theoret-
ically and quantitatively analyzes and compares the effectiveness of access
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control models. The framework is composed of five core functions of access
control models: authorization decision-making, policy modification, permis-
sion modification, revocation and permission review. The functions underly-
ing access control models are theoretically analyzed for their time complexity,
and these results are then used to compare several access control models.
• The dissertation examines how shared information can be protected from
unauthorized or improper use, disclosure, alteration, and destruction by in-
siders, as described in Alshehri [5]. The dissertation uses a generic access con-
trol system to construct a threat model to assess the effectiveness of current
access control mechanisms, including RBAC, ABAC and BLAC, in mitigat-
ing insider threats. This assessment allows the contrast of the BLAC model
against the two major access control models, RBAC and ABAC.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the back-
ground in access control models and related work in this space. Chapter 3 presents
one approach for using attributes for secure access control via CP-ABE. Chapter 4
presents the BLAC model, which is a major contribution of this dissertation. Chap-
ters 5 and 6 present the evaluation framework and the generic access control threat
model respectively, and apply them to assess the effectiveness of the BLAC model.




This chapter reviews the foundational and related work in the area of access con-
trol, and motivates the need for developing an access control model that uses at-
tributes in access decisions while preserving the benefits of RBAC.
2.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
The term RBAC was first introduced and formally modeled in the early 1990s by
Ferraiolo and Kuhn [22]. Subsequently, Sandhu et al. proposed frameworks for
four RBAC models to meet various levels of complexity requirements [73]. These
models are core RBAC, hierarchical RBAC, static separation of duty relations, and
dynamic separation of duty relations. The core RBAC model introduces the basic
and minimum components of RBAC in which subjects are assigned to roles and
permissions are assigned to roles. The hierarchical RBAC extends the core model
by introducing the support for role hierarchies to define an inheritance relation
among roles. Separation of duty relations are used to enforce conflict of interest
policies to restrict subjects from exceeding a reasonable level of authority to per-
form a task. This is can be done through the static separation of duty or dynamic
9
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separation of duty relations. The former enforces strong constraints on the assign-
ment of subjects to roles; for example, if one role requests an order and another
approves it, the subject should not be assigned both roles. The latter enforces the
constraints on the assignment of subjects to roles in addition to the context such
as the time. All these models have the same limitations of the core RBAC that
Chapter 1 discusses.
RBAC has been widely investigated to meet various applications’ requirements.
The rest of this section presents the basic RBAC model and discusses the main
extensions of RBAC.
2.1.1 The Basic RBAC Model
The NIST model for RBAC [23] was adopted in this dissertation focusing, for the
sake of simplicity, on the core RBAC that introduces the required components for

















Figure 2.1: The basic components of the core RBAC, containing five data sets: subject, role,
object, operation and permission, and two relations: subject assignment and permission
assignment.
RBAC is defined in terms of five basic data sets: S (subjects), R (roles), OB (ob-
jects), OP (operations), and PERM (permissions), and two relations: SA (subject-
to-role assignment) and PA (permission-to-role assignment).
10
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Subjects are assigned to roles, and roles are associated with permissions that
define which operations can be performed over which objects. Subjects are defined
as individuals, and roles represent job functions within the organization. In the
context of healthcare, roles could be “doctor,” “nurse,” and “staff.” Permissions
could be “read a record” and “write a record.”
The following definition of RBAC is adopted from Ferraiolo et al. [23].
Definition 2.1.1. [RBAC]
• S, R, OP, and OB are subjects, roles, operations, and objects, respectively.
• SA ⊆ S × R, a many-to-many mapping subject-to-role assignment relation.
• assigned-subjects(r) = {s ∈ S | (s,r) ∈ SA }, the mapping of role r onto a set of
subjects.
• PERM (the set of permissions) ⊆ {(op,ob) | op ∈ OP
∧
ob ∈ OB }.
• PA⊆ PERM× R, a many-to-many mapping permission-to-role assignment relation.
• assigned-permissions(r) = {perm ∈ PERM | (perm,r) ∈ PA }, the mapping of role r
onto a set of permissions.
2.1.2 RBAC Extensions
RBAC is a good starting model for researchers to advance access control models
due to its widespread adoption and formal definition. These extensions are needed
to meet requirements in specific domain areas. One of the significant extensions
of RBAC is Context-Based Access Control (CBAC) in which access decisions are
based on the context of the request in addition to requesters’ roles concerning the
temporal constraints, as in Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) [11, 33]
or location constraints, as in Location-Based Access Control (LBAC) [19,68]. Other
11
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major extensions include Task-Role-Based Access Control (T-RBAC) [61, 72], and
Privacy-Aware Role-Based Access Control (P-RBAC) [47, 59].
In TRBAC, the use of permissions assigned to roles can be enabled only dur-
ing specific temporal periods which can be fixed or periodic. Bertino et al. [11]
proposed a TRBAC model that supports temporal constraints on role activation
and deactivation. Thus, roles can be in two states: active, in which the associated
roles can be used, and non-active, in which associated roles cannot be used. The
model also defines temporal dependencies among role activation and deactivation
which can be expressed through triggers. For example, when a role is activated,
a trigger can be set up to activate another role. Joshi et al. [33] extended TRBAC
to a generalized TRBAC (GTRBAC) that introduced temporal constraints user-role
assignments, and role-permission assignments in addition to roles.
In LBAC, access decisions are based on roles and constraints on users’ locations
to meet the increasing security requirements by mobile applications and users.
Thus, access requests are granted, for example, when users are in a specific loca-
tion within an organization’s premises or a location that satisfies certain security
properties. Damiani et al. [19] extended RBAC by supporting the notation of spa-
tial roles for geographically bounded organizational functions. The boundary of a
role is defined as a feature such as road, city or hospital. This boundary specifies
the spatial extent in which the user has to be located in to use the role. Ray and
Toahchoodee [68] extended LBAC to support spatial and temporal constraints on
users and objects.
In T-RBAC, access decisions are based on roles and tasks that represent funda-
mental units of business activity in enterprise environments. A role can be “Sales
Manager,” and a task can “review sales results.” Oh and Park [61] extended RBAC
by incorporating the notation of tasks in addition to roles to evaluate access re-
quests. In their model, permissions are assigned to tasks, and tasks are assigned to
12
2.2. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL (ABAC)
roles. Sainan [72] extended the model by Oh and Park by introducing constraints
rules between users and roles, and roles and tasks.
In P-RBAC, privacy policies are incorporated in access control systems, thus
access to private and sensitive data is considered when making access decisions.
Ni et al. [59] extended RBAC to support privacy policies through introducing pur-
poses, conditions and obligations. Purposes are the reasons for data access. Obli-
gations are actions that must be performed after an access has been executed. Con-
ditions are prerequisites needed to be met before any action can be executed. In the
proposed model, users are assigned to roles, and permissions are assigned to roles.
However, the main difference here is the structure of the privacy permissions.
Masoumzadeh and Joshi [47] extended the model presented by Ni et al. by
treating a purpose as an intermediary entity between a role and permission enti-
ties. The model also defines constraints and obligations as conditions on assign-
ment of permissions to purposes. In Masoumzadeh and Joshi’s model, users are
assigned to roles, purposes are assigned to roles, permissions are then assigned to
purposes, and conditions are assigned to permission.
2.2 Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC)
Access decisions in ABAC are based on the use of attributes that are compared
against rules created by security administrators. These attributes are associated
with entities such as subjects, objects and the context of access requests. To the
best of the author’s knowledge, the first work that explicitly introduced a model
for ABAC was by Yuan and Tong [101]. However, the use of attributes and policies
was introduced earlier through the use of security credentials [14, 15, 63].
13
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2.2.1 The Basic ABAC Model
The concept of ABAC is based on the use of attributes (subjects, environments, and
objects) and access rules [27,101]. In addition, attributes are sets of key-value pairs
to describe subjects, objects, and environments. The basic components of ABAC















Figure 2.2: The basic components of ABAC, employing attributes of subjects, objects, envi-
ronment conditions and access policies. SAT, EAT and ObAT represent subject attributes,
environment attributes and object attributes respectively.
Here, <Provider, Doctor> and <Department, Cardiology> could be subject at-
tributes. <Patient Name, Bob> and <Document Type, Summary Of Care> could be
object attributes. <Access IP=192.123.*.*>, on the other hand, could be an envi-
ronment attribute. Here, an example access rule could be A doctor who works in
Cardiology can access Bob’s summary of care report from a computer on a specific subnet
of the hospital’s network.
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Attributes can be static or dynamic, depending on how frequently their val-
ues change. Access rules, i.e. policies, are defined using attributes. Requesters
must possess attributes that satisfy relevant rules to be granted access to requested
objects.
The following definition of ABAC is adopted from Yuan and Tong [101].
Definition 2.2.1. [ABAC]
• S, OB, and E are subjects, objects, and environments, respectively.
• SATk (1≤ k≤ K), ObATm (1≤m≤M), and EATn (1≤ n≤N) are the pre-defined
attributes for subjects, objects, and environments, respectively.
• ATTR(s), ATTR(o), and ATTR(e) are attribute assignment relations for subject s,
object o, and environment e, respectively:
ATTR(s) ⊆ SA1 × SA2 ×. . .× SAK
ATTR(o) ⊆ OA1 × OA2 ×. . .× OAM
ATTR(e) ⊆ EA1 × EA2 ×. . .× EAN.
• A policy rule that decides whether subject s can access object o in a particular envi-
ronment e, is a boolean function of s, o, and e’s attributes:
Rule: can-access (s, o, e)← f (ATTR(s),ATTR(o),ATTR(e))
i.e. given all the attribute assignments of s, o, and e, if the function’s evaluation is
true, then the access to the object is granted; otherwise the access is denied.
• A policy store, as shown in Figure 2.2, may consist of a number of policy rules.
The policy decision engine evaluates the applicable policy rules in the policy store for




Yuan and Tong [101] discussed the challenges of access control for web services.
They proposed an ABAC model based on subject, object, and environment at-
tributes. They also described the model in terms of authorization architecture and
policy formulation. The ABAC model here consists of two sub-models: the policy
model that defines the policies, and the architecture model that applies the poli-
cies to web services. In the policy model, a policy rule is a Boolean function that
decides on whether a subject s can access a resource r in a particular environment
e. For example,
Rule : can-access(s, r, e)← f (ATTR(s),ATTR(r),ATTR(e)).
Given the attributes of s, r, and e, if the function’s evaluation returns true, then the
access to the resource is granted; otherwise the access is denied. The ABAC model
described by Yuan and Tong, however, does not consider operations on resources
and does not provide any implementation details of the policy evaluation.
Subsequently, many researchers presented other models for ABAC for different
applications and domains [4, 38,40, 79,102]. Hai-bo and Fan described a model for
ABAC for web services [79] that evaluate access requests to web services based on
the attributes that requesters hold. Hai-bo and Fan did not provide any algorithms
or implementation specifications.
Alipour et al. [4] extended Yuan and Tong’s ABAC model for SOA environ-
ments. Zhu and Smari [102] presented an ABAC model for collaboration envi-
ronments. Their model incorporated trust and privacy preserving concerns by
monitoring subjects’ previous behavior and ensuring that the purpose of access
corresponds to the intended use of the requested objects.
Lang et al. [38] described an Attribute-Based Multipolicy Access Control Model
for Grid Computing that addressed the problem of supporting multiple types of
policies without changing the policy description and evaluation mechanism. Also,
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Li et al. presented an ABAC model for ubiquitous e-business environments [40].
HP Praesidium Authorization Server was a commercial implementation of a
rule-based access control model [34]. It centralizes authorization rules and priv-
ileges in a single database shared by multiple applications. Rules and privileges
are specified by an organization to define access rules in the former and to specify
access limits for subjects in the latter. Thus, when a subject requests to perform
a transaction, transaction attributes input from the application and privilege at-
tributes input from the privilege are evaluated against an access rule for each priv-
ileges of the requesting subject. If true, access is granted, if false, continue; if all
privileges specified for the requesting subject have been evaluated to false, access
is denied.
Although all the previously mentioned research work was important to ad-
vance ABAC models, it did not consider the complexity of ABAC in terms of priv-
ilege management, user permissions, and permission review for a user.
2.3 Revising the NIST-RBAC Model
Due to the limitations of RBAC and ABAC, Kuhn et al. [37] recently announced a
NIST initiative that focuses on addressing the need of including attributes in access
decisions while preserving the benefits of RBAC. Kuhn et al. suggested combining
RBAC and ABAC to leverage the advantages of each. They discussed three possi-
ble combination strategies for integrating attributes into RBAC: (1) dynamic roles,
(2) attribute centric, and (3) role centric. The rest of this section discusses these




In this approach, attributes are used to dynamically assign subjects to roles. This
dynamic role approach has been studied by Al-Kahtani et al. [2] and Huang et
al. [29]. Although these models solved the problem of assigning subjects into roles,
they inherit the major limitations of RBAC described earlier in chapter 1, includ-
ing the lack of granularity and flexibility and dynamic adaptability. Al-Kahtani et
al. [2] introduced a rule-based RBAC model that uses rules defined by an organiza-
tion. These rules are used to automatically assign users to roles taking into account
users’ attributes and constraints on using roles.
Huang et al. [29] presented an integrated model of RBAC and ABAC. The
idea behind the model is the composition of two layers: aboveground and under-
ground. The former constructs a traditional RBAC model extended with envi-
ronment constraints. The latter uses attribute-based user-role assignment poli-
cies and role-permission assignment policies to automate user-role assignment and
role-permission assignment functions for the aboveground level or the traditional
RBAC model. Again, neither of the models address the problem of granularity and
dynamic adaptability, which is the focus of this work.
2.3.2 Attribute-centric Approach
In the attribute centric approach, roles are defined as attributes of subjects. Thus,
roles are not assigned to a set of permissions as in RBAC. This approach discards
all the advantages of RBAC and inherits all the disadvantages of ABAC discussed
earlier in Section 1. Basic ABAC models presented earlier can be used to imple-




In the role-centric approach, attributes are used to constrain the permissions as-
signed to roles. Although this approach retains the ability of RBAC to determine
the maximum set of permissions for a single user, it lacks ABAC’s flexibility be-
cause the maximum permission sets are constrained by the use of roles. Jin et
al. [31] present a model for a role-centric approach that incorporates RBAC basic
elements in addition to user attributes, object attributes, and permission filtering
policy (PFP).
The PFP constrains the available set of permissions based on user and object
attributes. The avail-session-perm function in basic RBAC returns the permission set
associated with the roles activated in a given session. However, in this model, the
function returns the maximum permission set for a given session. The permission
set is then reduced by the PFP. For each of the permissions in the permission set,
there is a function that maps objects to subsets of Boolean filter functions, which are
based on the use of object attributes. These filter functions are compared against
the associated permission within the permission set returned by avail-session-perm.
If any of these functions returns false, the permission is blocked and removed from
the available permission set for the given session.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the background and reviewed the related word in the area
of access control to set the stage for this dissertation. It defined and reviewed the
basic access control models, RBAC and ABAC and their extensions. The chapter
also discussed the call by NIST to advance access control models to use attributes
and policies for making access decisions while preserving RBAC’s advantages.
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Access Control using Attribute-Based
Encryption
Cloud computing has been viewed as an appropriate platform to deploy appli-
cations in various domains for its cost-effective services (including data manage-
ment and storage, and computational resources) and features (portability, reliabil-
ity, scalability, and elasticity) delivered by cloud service providers [18]. Despite
these attractions to cloud-based systems, cloud service providers are not trusted to
store private information unencrypted, for example EHRs, even when traditional
access control models are in place [18]. This is because unencrypted information
stored in the cloud is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure or alteration. Thus,
end-to-end information encryption (including storage and transmission) must be
required in cloud-based systems.
Standard encryption techniques, however, are not well suited for EHR and sim-
ilar systems, especially in cloud-based settings, as multiple subjects have have
overlapping but distinct roles and attributes in accessing EHR and similar pro-
tected data. The following paragraphs review standard encryption techniques and
discuss their unsuitability for such cloud-based systems.
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• Symmetric-Key Encryption (SKE). These techniques, for example, AES (Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard), typically provide secrecy between two parties.
SKE uses a shared key k for encryption and decryption;
M = Dk(Ek(M)).
In the above function, E is the encryption function and it uses the shared key
k to encrypt the message M. D, on the other hand, is the decryption function
and it uses the shared key k to decrypt the encrypted message. For two par-
ties, say Alice and Bob to use SKE, they first need to agree on a shared key
k. Alice then encrypts M using the the encryption algorithm E and key k to
obtain the ciphertext C = Ek(M). Alice then sends C to Bob. Bob uses the de-
cryption algorithm D and the same key k to recover the message M = Dk(C).
SKE techniques are usually efficient but introduce complexity in systems as
additional mechanisms are required to apply access control. Also, parties
who want to use SKE need first to agree on the shared key via key exchange
methods, for example public-key cryptography, such as Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. As SKE uses a shared key among parties, if the shared key is com-
promised, all encrypted information is compromised.
• Public-Key Encryption (PKE). Techniques such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman) provide methods for shared key distribution, authentication and
non-repudiation. In PKE, each subject has a pair of keys: a public key pk that
is known to everyone, and a secret key sk that is only known to the subject.
PKE uses the public key pk for encryption and the secret key sk for decryption:
M = Dsk(Epk(M)).
In the above function, E, the encryption function, uses the public key pk to
encrypt the message M. D, the decryption function, uses the secret key sk to
decrypt the encrypted message. Again, for Alice and Bob to use PKE, assume
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Bob has the pair of keys: pk and sk, and that Alice wants to encrypt a mes-
sage M for Bob. Alice encrypts M using the encryption algorithm E and Bob’s
public key pk to obtain the ciphertext C = Epk(M). Alice sends C to Bob who
uses the decryption function and his secret key sk to compute M = Dsk(C) to
recover the message M. PKE are are not practical for secure storage due to
the requirement for an expensive public-key infrastructure (PKI) to be main-
tained for distributing and managing public keys and digital certificates for
subjects.
The above inadequacies with standard access control and encryption techniques
in supporting cloud-based systems motivate the investigation of other approaches.
This work builds on CP-ABE [13] that utilizes attributes for accessing and handling
secure data.
This chapter shows how attributes and policies in CP-ABE can be used effec-
tively in designing access control systems, which improve the process of making
access-control decisions through the design and development of a secure attribute-
based system, as described in Alshehri [6]. Particularly, the dissertation shows that
CP-ABE provides promising performance to enforce access control in information-
sharing environments.
This chapter first presents the relevant background in cryptography. It then
describes the proposed design for the cloud-based system using CP-ABE in the
context of healthcare domain. Although the focus is on EHR systems, the pro-
posed design is general and may be applied to other domains where users have
multiple overlapping roles and attributes in data access and handling, for exam-
ple, financial services and critical infrastructure protection systems. This chapter
then provides an assessment of performance of secure cloud-based EHR systems
to validate the proposed approach. Finally, the chapter discusses the related work
in cryptography and EHR systems.
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3.1 Cryptography Preliminaries
This section reviews the needed background in cryptography to pave the way to
the discussion of the secure attribute-based access system in the next section.
3.1.1 Bilinear Maps
Bilinear Maps, or pairings, construct a relationship between two cryptographic
groups leading to new schemes. Boneh and Franklin’s pairing-based encryption
scheme [16] was the first to construct a fully functional Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) that is based on bilinear mapping on groups of elliptic curves over finite
fields. IDE, however, was originally proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984 [77], by us-
ing a public key as an arbitrary string to identify a user. Seventeen years later,
Boneh and Franklin built an elegant scheme using bilinear maps (Weil pairing)
over elliptic curves and finite fields [16]. The abstract definition of bilinear pairing
is presented in Definition 3.1.1.
Definition 3.1.1. [Bilinear Maps]
Let G1 and G2 be cyclic groups of prime order p; g a generator of G1. e is a bilinear map, e:
G1 × G1→ G2, where |G1| = |G2| = p. The bilinear map e has three properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀ P,Q ∈ G1, ∀ a,b ∈ Z∗p, e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab,
• Non-Degeneracy: P 6= 0⇒ e(P,P) 6= 1,
• Computability: e is efficiently computable.
The computable pairing function e must be efficient. This means, in practice,
when a system using e is deployed, e must be fast enough so a subject using the
system must not notice any slowdown [42].
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3.1.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a type of public-key Cryptography (PKC)
that is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. The re-
lationship between elliptic curves and cryptography was first introduced by Hen-
drik Lenstra [39] in 1987 when he presented the elliptic curve factorization method
for integer factorization which employs elliptic curves. This discovery inspired re-
searchers to investigate other approaches to incorporate elliptic curves into cryp-
tography. In 1985, Koblitz [35] and Miller [54] independently suggested the use of
elliptic curve over a finite field for cryptographic schemes. The security of these
cryptographic schemes rely on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem. The elliptic curves over finite field and the elliptic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem are defined defined in Definition 3.1.2 and Definition 3.1.3 respec-
tively.
Definition 3.1.2. [Elliptic Curves over Finite Field]
Let Fp be a finite field where p > 3 is a prime, and a, b ∈ Fp such that 4a3 + 27b2 6=
0 (mod p). An elliptic curve E[Fp] is the set of solutions, called points P = (x, y) to the
equation y2 = x3 +ax+b (mod p), together with the point at infinity 0. Addition of points
on ECC is defined to form the so-called elliptic curve group. For P ∈ E[F], nP denotes
P + P + . . .+ P, n times.
Definition 3.1.3. [Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem]
If E is an elliptic curve over a field F, then the elliptic curve discrete logarithm to base Q ∈
E[F] is the problem of finding an n ∈ Z such that P = nQ for a given P ∈ E[F].
The advantage of using ECC is that it can achieve RSA-equivalent security with
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a much smaller group. For example, a 163-bit key in ECC is considered to be as se-
cure as 1024-bit key in RSA. This results in smaller key sizes and faster implemen-
tations. These features allow ECC to be suitable to be used on compact platforms
such as smart phones and smart cards [36].
The PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) library [43] is designed to perform im-
plementations for pairing-based cryptosystems including elliptic curve genera-
tion, elliptic curve arithmetic and pairing computation. The PBC library supports
seven types of elliptic curves for pairing-based cryptography over finite fields;
however, these curves can be grouped into supersingular curves and ordinary
curves. These types of curves are as follows [42, 43].
1. Type A Curves: Let E be an elliptic curve of the form
y2 = x3 + ax for any a
over a finite field Fp for some prime p = 3 (mod 4). 1, -1 and -3 are good
choices for a to achieve the best performance. E[Fp] is supersingular, and thus
#E[Fp] = q + 1 and #E[Fp2 ] = (q + 1)2. Type A curves have an embedding
degree of 2.
2. Type B Curves: Let E be an elliptic curve of the form
y2 = x3 + b for any b
over a finite field Fp for some prime p = 2 (mod 3). Typically, b = 1 or -1. Sim-
ilar to the type A curves, E[Fp] is supersingular, and thus #E[Fp] = q + 1 and
#E[Fp2 ] = (q + 1)2. Again, these curves have an embedding degree of 2. Type
B curves are unimplemented in the PBC library as they provide no significant
advantage over type A curves [46].
3. Type C Curves: Let E be an elliptic curve of the form




y2 = x3 + 2x− 1 also over F3l .
Type C curves are unimplemented as well as few useful cryptographic curves
are found and pairings on these type of curves are vulnerable to certain dis-
crete log attacks [42].
4. Type D Curves: These are ordinary curves with embedding degree of 3, 4
or 6, however, 6 is the most useful. Type D curves are constructed using the
complex multiplication equation
DV2 = 4p− t2
Supposing D, V, p, t are integers and p is prime and D > 0, no square of an
odd prime divides D and D = 0, 3 mod 4. Type D curves are constructed by
substituting p = x2 + 1, t = ±x + 1 and U = 3x± 1 into the complex multipli-
cation equation, and solving the resulting equation. The resulting curves are
of order p∓ x.
5. Type E Curves: These are also ordinary curves with embedding degree of 1.
Type E curves can be constructed by setting t = 2, D = 7. Let r be a positive
integer and suppose p = 28r2h2 + 1 is prime for some h. Then the complex
multiplication equation becomes
7V2 = 4(28(rh)2 + 1)− 4
After these substitutions, the equation is solved to V = 4rh. As H7(x) =
x + 3375, if k = 3375/(17283375) in Fp then the produced curve is of the form
y2 = x3 + 3kx + 2k
of order p − 1 or p + 3. If this curve has the order p + 3, then use instead the
curve of the form
y2 = x3 + 3kc2x + 2kc3,
where c is any quadratic nonresidue ∈ Fp.
6. Type F Curves: These are also ordinary curves with embedding degree of 12.
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Type F curves can be constructed by setting p = 36x4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x + 1,
t = 6x2+1, and D = 3. Then the complex multiplication equation has solution
V = 6x2 + 4x + 1,
and p+1−t | p12−1. To construct a type F curve, any value of x can be chosen,
then p should be checked if it is a prime for x, and that n = p(x)t(x) + 1 has
a large prime factor r. If these statements are true, then different values of k
can be tried until a random point of y2 = x3 + k has order n is found.
7. Type G Curves: These are also ordinary curves with embedding degree of 10.
Type G curves can be constructed by setting p = 25x4 + 25x3 + 25x2 + 10x + 3,
t = 10x2 + 5x + 3, and D is squarefree and D = 43, 67 mod 120. A solution
(u; v) of the equation u2 − 15Dv2 = −20 needs to be find. u will always be
equal to 5 mod 15. Thus, x = (−5 ± u)/15. As in type F curves, p should be
checked if it is a prime for x, and that n = p(x)t(x) + 1 has a large prime factor
r. If yes, the complex multiplication equation is used to construct the curve.
3.1.3 Attribute-Based Encryption
Sahai and Waters subsequently introduced a new type of IBE called Fuzzy Identity-
Based Encryption (FIBE) [71]. FIBE is closely related to the concept of IBE that was
introduced by Shamir [77] and proposed by Boneh and Franklin [16] In FIBE, a
private key is associated with a set of attributes, ω, and able to decrypt ciphertexts
encrypted with a set of attributes, ω′, if and only if at least k attributes overlap
between ω′ and ω. FIBE’s motivation was to design an error-tolerant IBE that uses
biometric identities as public keys. IBE and FIBE have limited applications, as they
do not allow for a scalable and fine-grained access control to ciphertexts.
Bethencourt, Sahai, and Waters [13] constructed the first CP-ABE in which pri-
vate keys are labeled with sets of attributes and ciphertexts are associated with
access structures consisting of AND and OR gates. The limitation of this work
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was the lack of expressing negative attributes due to the use of monotonic access
structures. The definition of access structure is presented in Definition 3.1.4.
Definition 3.1.4. [Access Structure]
Let following be as set of parties: {P1,P2, ...,Pn}. A collection A⊆ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} is monotone
if ∀ B,C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access structure (respectively, monotone
access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets
of {P1,P2, ...,Pn}, i.e., A⊆ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} \ {∅}. The sets in A are called the authorized sets,
and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
Current implementations of CP-ABE are typically based on the construction of
a bilinear pairing between two elliptic curve groups [13].
A CP-ABE scheme consists of four fundamental algorithms: Setup, Encrypt,
KeyGen, and Decrypt, and one optional algorithm, Delegate.
Bethencourt’s CP-ABE Construction
Let G0 be a bilinear group of prime order p, and let g be a generator of G0. In
addition, let e: G0 × G0 → G1 denote the bilinear map. A security parameter, k,
will determine the size of the groups.
The Lagrange coefficient ∆i,S for i ∈ Zp and a set, S, of elements in Zp: ∆i,S(x) =
Πj∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j is defined. Additionally, a hash function H: {0, 1}
∗→ G0 is employed to
map any attribute described as a binary string to a random group element.
• Setup:
The setup algorithm begins with choosing a bilinear group G0 of prime order
p with generator g. Next, the algorithm randomly selects two numbers: α and
β ∈ Zp. Accordingly, the public key and master key are as follows.
PK = G0, g, h = gβ ,f = g1/β , e(g, g)α
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MK = (β, gα),
where G0 is the bilinear group of prime order p, g is the generator of G0, e(g, g)
is the bilinear pairing, e: G0 × G0→ G1.
• KeyGen(MK, S):
The key generation algorithm takes two parameters, the master key MK of
the CPABE scheme, and a set of attributes S that describe a subject, and out-
puts a private key for that subject SK. The algorithm first randomly selects a
value r ∈ Zp, and then randomly chooses values rj ∈ Zp for each attribute j ∈
S. The secret key is solved as follows.
SK= (D = g(α+r)/β , ∀ j ∈ S: Dj = gr · H(j)rj, D′j = grj),
where H(j) is the hash function that relates any attribute described as binary
string to an element of G0.
• Encrypt(PK, M, T ):
The encryption algorithm takes three parameters, the public key PK, a mes-
sage M, and a tree access structure T over a set of attributes. It will en-
crypt M and produce a ciphertext CT such that only a user who possesses
the set of attributes satisfying the tree access structure will be able to de-
crypt CT. The encryption process starts with producing a polynomial qx
for each node x in T starting from the root node R. The degree dx of these
qx are dx = kx − 1, where kx is the threshold value of the node x. Starting
with qR ,the polynomial of root node R, the algorithm sets qR(0) = s, where
s ∈ Zp is randomly chosen, and then chooses other random points to define
the other coefficients of the polynomial qR. For the rest of qx of the other
nodes x, the algorithm sets qx(0) = qparent(x) (index(x)) and chooses other ran-
domly points to define the other coefficients of the polynomials qx. After
the polynomials are generated, the ciphertext is then constructed as follows.
CT = (T , C̃ = Me(g, g)αs, C = hs,
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∀ y ∈ Y: Cy = gqy(0), C′y = H(att(y))qy(0)), where Y is the set of all leaf nodes in
T .
• Decrypt(PK, CT, SK):
The decryption algorithm takes three inputs, the public key PK, the ciphertext
CT, which was obtained for a tree access structure T , and the private key SK
for a set S of attributes. If the set S of attributes satisfies the access structure
T , then the algorithm decrypts the ciphertext CT and returns the message M.
The decryption algorithm performs the decryption in a two-step process. The
first step determines if tree access structure T of the ciphertext CT satisfies the
set of attributes S of SK. The second step decrypts CT to obtain M. The first
step calls a recursive algorithm DecryptNode(CT,SK,x), where x is a node









If i 6∈ S, then DecryptNode(CT,SK,x) = ⊥.
If x is not a leaf node, then DecryptNode(CT,SK,z) calls for all z where z are
children of x, and stores the results in Fz. It then randomly chooses Sx a kx-
sized subset of child nodes of z where Fz 6= ⊥. If Sx does not exist, then
DecryptNode(CT,SK,x) = ⊥; otherwise, a polynomial interpolation is per-
formed on the nodes to compute e(g, g)rqz(0). If the return value in both cases,
x is a leaf node and a non leaf node, is not ⊥ or an error value, the decryp-
tion process begins by calling the decryption algorithm starting from the root
node R and setting
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A = DecryptNode(CT,SK,R) = e(g, g)rqR(0) = e(g, g)rs.
The decryption algorithm decrypts CT to obtain M by computing
C̃ / (e(C,D) / A) = C̃ / (e(hs, g(α+r)/β) / e(g, g)rs) = M.
• Delegate(SK, S̃):
The delegation algorithm takes as inputs a secret key SK for some set of at-
tributes S and a set S̃ ⊆ S. It outputs a secret key S̃K for the set of attributes
S̃. As in the key generation algorithm, the delegation algorithm randomly
selects a value r̃ and r̃k ∀ k ∈ S̃. The delegate secret key S̃K is constructed as
follows.
S̃K= (D̃ = Df r̃, ∀ k ∈ S̃: D̃k = Dk gr̃ H(k)̃rk, D̃′k = D′k gr̃k).
Tools for implementing the CP-ABE scheme are the cpabe toolkit developed by
Bethencourt et al. [32], the CHARM library developed by Akinyele et al. [1] and
PIRATTE Jahid and Borisov [82]. The cpabe toolkit lacks the support of the delega-
tion function and the ability to perform asymmetric bilinear pairings— such that
e: G1 × G2 → GT. The CHARM library allows the construction of both symmetric
and asymmetric bilinear pairings. On the other hand, the PIRATTE scheme re-
quires the use of asymmetric pairings. This is to prevent subjects from maliciously
combining the same group in case of using the symmetric pairings to skip the key
revocation [46].
Martin [46] experimented with various types of curves for the different func-
tions of CP-ABE. In KeyGen(MK,S) function, type F curves was the fastest, fol-
lowed by A, D, E, and G curves. In the Encrypt(PK, M, T ) function, similar to
the KeyGen(MK,S) function, type F curves was the fastest, then type A curves
and type D curves. Type G curves was the slowest. In the Decrypt(PK, CT, SK)
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function, type F curves performed the worst. Type A curves was the fastest, fol-
lowed by type D and E curves. So in overall, the performance of type A, D, and F
curves were acceptable for the usage of CPABE. However, type F curves may not
be recommended for the poor performance in the Decrypt(PK, CT, SK) function.
3.2 A Cloud-Based EHR System
This section explores the proposed design, based on CP-ABE, for a cloud-based
EHR system that provides secure EHR storage, with flexible, fine-grained access
control.
3.2.1 The CP-ABE Scheme
Following Bethencourt, Sahai, and Waters [13], healthcare providers share one
public key for encryption in the proposed CP-ABE design, thus avoiding PKI;
however, each healthcare provider has a distinct secret key for decryption. CP-
ABE supports complex policies to specify which secret keys can decrypt which ci-
phertexts: each healthcare provider’s secret key is labeled with a set of attributes,
and ciphertexts are associated with access policies. The secret key of a healthcare
provider can decrypt a particular ciphertext only if the attribute set of the health-
care provider’s key satisfies the access policy associated with that ciphertext, as il-
lustrated in Figure 3.1. Here, the nurse practitioner with the ABCD Medical Group
can access EHRs that are only allowed to physician assistants or nurse practition-
ers, and who work in the ABCD Medical Group; and the physician assistant with
the WXYZ Medical Group is not allowed access.
CP-ABE thus supports flexible and fine-grained access control with healthcare
providers being able to access only relevant EHRs encrypted with access policies
that satisfy their keys’ attributes. Also, if a secret key is compromised, only EHRs
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Figure 3.1: An example of using CP-ABE in a cloud-based EHR system. A record is en-
crypted with an access structure stating that any physician assistant or nurse practitioner
who works in the ABCD Medical Group can decrypt the record. Here, the nurse practi-
tioner is allowed to access (and decrypt) the record, but not the physician assistant as he
doesn’t work in the ABCD Medical Group.
that can be decrypted with that key will be compromised; other EHRs are still
protected.
3.2.2 System Architecture
In the proposed scheme, EHRs are stored in the cloud, and can be accessed through
a web portal by multiple users who are typically healthcare professionals. The
users who create EHRs are also responsible for generating access policies based
on the attributes of authorized healthcare providers, encrypting EHRs based on
the generated policies and uploading encrypted EHRs into the cloud. EHRs are
organized into a labeled hierarchical data structure [10], which makes it possible
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to share different parts of the EHR, thus making the scheme more flexible.
Figure 3.2 shows the architecture for the proposed cloud-based EHR system,
which consists of three main components: the cloud-based EHR system, health-
care providers (users), and the Attribute Authority (AA). The system uses two
fundamental cloud services: data storage and computing resources. The first ser-
vice is for storing encrypted EHRs that are accessible only to healthcare providers
through authentication mechanisms, and access policies based on complete at-
tributes of healthcare providers. The second service is for hosting the web portal,





























Figure 3.2: The cloud-based EHR system architecture consisting of three main compo-
nents: the cloud-based EHR system, healthcare providers (users), and the attribute au-
thority (AA).
Once healthcare providers obtain their private keys from the AA, they log in
to the system using their username and password; on first login, they will need
to download and install lightweight software for encrypting and decrypting EHRs
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locally. When a healthcare provider requests access to an encrypted record, she will
first locate and download it, and then use her key and the lightweight software to
decrypt it. To upload a new record, she will first request the desired attributes and
generate the access policy using the Access Policy Engine; encrypt the record using
the lightweight software; and finally upload the encrypted record.
3.2.3 Key Management
Key management must be cost-effective and its components are carefully imple-
mented. In the proposed system, key management is handled appropriately for
cloud-based EHR systems.
• Generation and Distribution: The AA generates the public and master pri-
vate keys using the Setup algorithm. When a new healthcare provider joins
the system, the AA derives a distinct secret key associated with her attributes
by running the Key Generation algorithm off-line. Healthcare providers must
store their secret keys securely, and regenerate keys after a predefined expi-
ration date. Secret key regeneration is performed without the need to re-
fresh the system parameters, public key, and master private key. Healthcare
providers can only seek their secret keys through their healthcare organiza-
tions.
• Revocation: The cloud-based EHR requires forward secrecy such that when
a healthcare provider’s access is revoked, she should not be allowed to access
EHRs that she was able to access before being revoked. Owners of encrypted
EHRs have the option to add an expiration date to access policies used for
encryption, or to re-encrypt them with updated access policies to prevent
access by revoked healthcare providers. The problem of re-distributing secret
keys is thus avoided.
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• Escrow: In the cloud-based EHR system, the AA can regenerate secret keys
for healthcare providers to access EHRs during emergencies.
3.3 Analysis
To evaluate the feasibility of the proposed design, several experiments were con-
ducted to measure overhead in terms of time and storage. The experiments were
run on a virtual machine with 1GB of RAM, and hosted on 2.26GHz. The CP-ABE
implementation uses a 160-bit elliptic curve group on the curve y2 = x3 + x over
a 512-bit finite field. It also uses the Pairing Based Cryptography library [43] to
perform the pairing-based cryptosystems utilizing bilinear mapping.
3.3.1 Time Overhead
To measure the efficiency of the encryption and decryption algorithms, five image
files (1MB, 10MB, 20MB, 30MB, 40MB, and 50MB) were encrypted with six differ-
ent numbers of attributes in the access structure, and then decrypted with a secret
key that is associated with ten attributes. Figure 3.4 shows how the encryption time
increases almost linearly with the number of attributes in the access structures.
This is because when files are encrypted, the access trees need to be created over
the set of attributes, and the more number of attributes, a single access tree has, the
more polynomials need to be produced. On the other hand, Figure 3.3 shows that
the decryption time tends to be independent of the number of attributes. This is
because a single key is used, and decryption time is spent on verifying whether the
access structure associated with the ciphertext satisfies the attributes of the single
key. Each experiment was repeated five times, and the elapsed time was averaged
to yield the efficiency measure.
In the context of EHR systems, records less than 1MB are encrypted in less
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than 0.2 seconds depending on the number of attributes in the access structures,
and decrypted in less than 0.1 seconds, as shown in figures 3.4 and 3.3. On the
other hand, medical images that are 30MB are likely to be encrypted in less than
0.5 seconds with respect to the number of attributes in the access structures, and
decrypted in less than 0.4 seconds. These results indicate that the time performance
of CP-ABE is feasible for EHR systems.

































Figure 3.3: Encryption time for varying number of attributes in the access structure (for
five image sizes). Encryption time increases almost linearly with the number of attributes
in the access structures as access trees need to be created.
3.3.2 Storage Overhead
To determine storage overhead, the difference between encrypted records and de-
crypted records across various numbers of attributes in the access structures was
measured. The difference is relatively small for all the files and increases linearly
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Figure 3.4: Decryption time for varying number of attributes in the access structure (for
five image sizes). Decryption time tends to be independent of the number of attributes as
a single key is used.
with respect to the number of attributes in the access structures as shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. This is also because when files are encrypted, the created access trees over
the set of attributes need to be stored, and the more number of attributes a single
access tree has, the more polynomials need to be produced and stored.
The difference is less than 4KB for simpler access structures and less than 30KB
for complex access structures. The results suggest that storage overhead is negli-
gible in the context of cloud-based EHR systems because cloud service providers
currently (and will continue to) provide large amounts of storage at reasonable
prices.
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Figure 3.5: Difference between ciphertext and plaintext in size for varying number of at-
tributes in the access structure (for five image sizes). The difference increases linearly with
the number of attributes in the access structures due to the need to store the generated
access trees.
3.4 Related Work
In this chapter, the terms electronic medical record (EMR), electronic health record
(EHR), and personal health record (PHR) systems followed the definitions pro-
vided by the National Alliance for Health Information Technology [57].
EMR systems manage EHRs that can be created, gathered, and managed by au-
thorized healthcare providers within one healthcare organization. Benaloh et al. [10]
propose a patient controlled encryption EMR system that enables patients to medi-
ate access control decisions over their medical records. EHRs are partitioned into
a hierarchical structure in which each section is encrypted with a derived public
key that patients are required to manage, and decrypted with a derived subkey
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from a master private key. This system has several issues: potential key manage-
ment overhead, no support for a key escrow agent in emergencies, and likely data
integrity issues as EHRs are managed by patients, not healthcare providers.
EHR systems manage EHRs that can be created, gathered, and managed by
authorized healthcare providers across more than one healthcare organization. Al-
though several EMR and PHR systems have been proposed, there is little research
in the area of cloud-based EHR systems. Commercial cloud-based EHR systems
such as Practice Fusion [64] and CareCloud [17] are available; although they are
HIPAA compliant, the security of EHRs is only based on access control decisions
mediated by their cloud storage providers. EHRs are stored unencrypted, which
has security and privacy implications.
PHR systems manage personal EHRs that are imported from EMR and EHR sys-
tems by patients. Narayan et al. [56] introduce a patient controlled encryption
PHR system that enables a patient to import EHRs into the cloud, and encrypt
each record with SKE using different keys. Along with each encrypted record,
the patient uploads a corresponding entry consisting of encrypted metadata using
a broadcast ABE, unencrypted access policy, and a search-index. For healthcare
providers to access a record, they must decrypt the metadata entry to find the
location and name of the record and the symmetric key. They then request the en-
crypted record from the cloud server, and decrypt it using the symmetric key. In
Narayan’s scheme, only patients can be the owners of EHRs, thus this scheme can-
not be used for cloud-based EHR systems. HealthVault [49], a cloud-based PHR
service offered by Microsoft, and the soon-to-be discontinued Google Health [25]
service both guarantee encryption during EHR transmission from patient to the
cloud and back, but to secure EHR storage, they seem to rely primarily on proper
access control and limiting physical access rather than full encryption.
Finally, substantial attention has been paid recently to querying encrypted data
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stored externally or in the cloud, e.g., Li at al. [41], but the focus here is on efficient
and effective access control of cloud data.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a general design for a secure cloud-based system using
CP-ABE and applied it to EHRs. This approach provided an effective solution to
several issues related to standard encryption and access control mechanisms. It
also investigated the feasibility of adopting CP-ABE in terms of performance and
storage overhead. The results suggest that the proposed design would provide
promising performance and consume negligible storage, and thus CP-ABE can be
used to enforce access control in information-sharing environments.
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Chapter 4
The BiLayer Access Control Model
(BLAC)
This chapter addresses a major objective of this dissertation which is the explo-
ration of using attributes and policies for developing effective access control mod-
els. It describes the work toward this objective in addressing the problem of ad-
vancing access control models and mechanisms to support the use of attributes
and access-control policies while preserving the advantages of RBAC. The result
has been the design and validation of BLAC model [7], which was in part inspired
by aspects of CP-ABE presented in Chapter 3.
The rest of this chapter defines the BLAC model, describes the concept of pseu-
doroles and their generation, and presents policy specification and evaluation meth-
ods used in the BLAC model. It then informally validates the practical viability of
BLAC model by applying it to the healthcare domain.
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4.1 Overview of the BLAC Model
The BLAC model is designed to support attributes and policies while preserving
the advantages of RBAC in terms of access control administration and user permis-
sion review. The model uses the concept of pseudorole, which is informally defined
as a set of values of static attributes of subjects. A pseudorole is not a real role,
which is traditionally defined as a job function in RBAC. This is because roles in
RBAC are defined independently from subject attributes.
Typically, subjects’ attributes are categorized as static (when attribute values
typically do not change) and dynamic (when attribute values change frequently).
Static attributes are for generating pseudoroles. Static and dynamic attributes are
used in policies to constrain pseudoroles.
The main concepts of BLAC are:
1. Subjects are assigned to pseudoroles and objects are associated with BLAC poli-
cies; these terms are formally defined in Definition 4.1.1 and Definition 4.1.2.
2. Access control is performed on a two-step evaluation procedure: (1) Pseudo-
Role function evaluation, and (2) rule(s) evaluation.
Definition 4.1.1. [Pseudorole]
Let s ∈ S be associated with a set of attributes sat ⊆ SAT. A pseudorole pr ∈ PR of s is a
collection of attrValuei of attri such that attri ∈ sat and attri is a static attributes of s.
Definition 4.1.2. [BLAC Policy]
A BLAC policy is a five-tuple, p = 〈pr, sat, obat, eat, opat〉, where pr ∈ PR, sat ⊆ SAT,
obat ⊆ OBAT, eat ⊆ EAT, and opat ⊆ OPAT.
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The BLAC model includes four basic data sets called S (subjects), OB (objects),
PR (pseudoroles), P (policies). The BLAC model is fundamentally defined as as-
signing subjects to pseudoroles and associating objects to policies. Thus, SPR
(subject-to-pseudorole assignment) and OBP (object-to-policy assignment) are two
relations that relate subjects to pseudoroles and objects to policies respectively.
Assigned subject maps a subject to a pseudorole, and assigned object maps an ob-
ject to a policy.
Subjects and objects in the BLAC model are defined consistently with earlier
access control models [23]. A subject is defined as an entity that requires access to
system resources (e.g. human users, machines or programs). An object is defined
as a system resource to which access must be controlled (e.g. files and directories,
columns, rows, and tables or printers).
The BLAC model is formally defined as follows:
• S = {s1, . . . , sn} is a set of subjects. Each subject has a unique identifier;
• SAT = {sat1, . . . , satn} is a set of subject attributes, where sati = {ai1, . . . , aim} is
the attributes of subject i ∈ S. Each attribute is a < attribute : attributeValue >
pair, aij =< attrj : attrValuej >, where attrj is an attribute identifier and
attrValuej is an attribute value of this identifier for subject i;
• OB = {ob1, . . . , obn} is a set of objects. Each object has a unique identifier;
• ObAT = {obat1, . . . , obatn} is a set of object attributes. obati = {ai1, . . . , aim}
is the attributes of object i ∈ Ob. Each attribute entry is a < attribute :
attributeValue > pair, aij =< attrj : attrValuej >, where attrj is an attribute
identifier and attrValuej is an attribute value of this identifier for object i;
• EAT = {eat1, . . . , eatn} is a set of environment attributes. Each attribute entry
is a < attribute : attributeValue > pair, eati =< attri : attrValuei >, where attri is
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an attribute identifier and attrValuei is an attribute value of this identifier;
• OpAT = {opat1, . . . , opatn} is a set of operation attributes. Each attribute is a
< attribute : attributeValue > pair, opati =< attri : attrValuei >, where attri is an
attribute identifier and attrValuei is an attribute value of this identifier;
• PR = {pr1, . . . , prn} is a set of pseudoroles as defined in Definition 4.1.1;
• P = {p1, . . . , pn} is a set of BLAC policies as defined in Definition 4.1.2;
• SPR ⊆ S×PR, a total function, subject-to-pseudorole assignment, that relates
s ∈ S 7→ pr ∈ PR;
• OBP ⊆ OB× P, a total function, object-to-policy assignment, that relates ob ∈
OB 7→ p ∈ P;
• assigned subject : S 7→ PS, the mapping of a subject s ∈ S to exactly one
pseudorole pr ∈ PR;
• assigned object : OB 7→ P, the mapping of an object ob ∈ OB to exactly one
policy p ∈ P;
Figure 4.1 depicts the BLAC model.
4.2 Pseudorole Generation
In the BLAC model, pseudoroles are the values of static attributes of subjects. Static
attributes used to compose pseudoroles are determined by humans to ensure the
rare changes. The data set of pseudoroles can be generated manually from pairing
all the values of the candidate static attributes. However, an automatic approach
borrowed from role mining in RBAC systems can be applied for generating pseu-


























Figure 4.1: The components of the BLAC model containing four data sets: subject, pseudo-
role, object and policy, and two relations: subject-pseudorole assignment and object-policy
assignment.
yet different from role mining approaches, in which role mining uses permissions
possessed by all subjects to generate roles. In the BLAC model, the values of the
attributes associated with all subjects are used to generate pseudoroles. The fol-
lowing paragraphs describe the pseudorole generating approach.
First, all distinct values in the first attribute column are found. Each value is
considered as a root of a tree. Then, all distinct values of the second attribute
column are found and added as nodes to each rooted tree. The process continues
depending on the number of attributes used to generate pseudoroles. Thus, if
three attributes are used, the process is repeated three times. After creating the
trees, each path from a leaf to the root is considered as a pseudorole.
To demonstrate the pseudorole generating approach, assume a hypothetical
medical center with nine subjects. Each subject is defined by name, identification
number ID, gender, the field of the healthcare provider, their department, and their of-
fice location. The nine subjects are presented in Table 4.1. Provider, Department, and
47
CHAPTER 4. THE BILAYER ACCESS CONTROL MODEL (BLAC)
Location are chosen for generating pseudoroles for being changed less frequently
at high granularity. Based on this example, the complete set of generated pseu-
doroles, as shown in Figure 4.2, is four trees with 24 distinct pseudoroles. In the
first tree, the path from the root to the leaf is “physician,” OB/GYN” and ”A.”
Thus, “Physician OB/GYN A” is a pseudorole.
All the generated pseudoroles in a system could considered even though not
all the pseudoroles can currently be associated with subjects because new subjects
might be added later to these unused pseudoroles. However, unreasonable pseu-
doroles such as “Physician Billing A” and “Physician Billing B” can be eliminated.
Although “Physician OB/GYN A” is a pseudorole, it is still three distinct attribute
values.
Table 4.1: Attributes of subjects demonstrating the pseudorole generating approach, show-
ing nine subjects with six attributes. Provider, Department and Location are chosen for
generating pseudoroles for being changed less frequently at high granularity.
Name ID Gender Provider Department Location
E. Robert 345-765 Female Physician OB/GYN A
A. Mark 526-874 Male Physician OB/GYN A
H. John 231-938 Female Nurse OB/GYN A
M. Martin 657-923 Female Administrative Staff OB/GYN A
E. Arthur 112-681 Male Billing Staff Billing A
J. Fox 437-348 Male Physician PCP B
H. Anderson 256-828 Female Nurse PCP B
F. Brown 562-910 Female Administrative Staff PCP B
D. Lee 102-581 Male Billing Staff Billing B
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Figure 4.2: The complete set of generated pseudoroles. A pseudorole in here is the path
from a root to a leaf. For example, in the first tree, the path from the root to the leaf is
“physician,” OB/GYN” and ”A.” Thus, “Physician OB/GYN A” is a pseudorole.
4.3 BLAC Policy Specification and Evaluation
To regulate access by subjects performing operations over objects within certain
environment settings via the BLAC model, it is essential to compose a policy struc-
ture based on the proposed BLAC model. A BLAC policy is specified to enable the
two-step evaluation procedure performed by the BLAC model, as discussed in the
following paragraphs.
A BLAC policy consists of two elements: a boolean function called PseudoRole,
and a set of one or more rules defined as boolean functions. Each rule has four
sub-elements also defined as boolean functions specifying the range of values that
must be satisfied for the subject, object, operation, and environment attributes. A
policy structure (using the XACML policy format [89]) is shown in Figure 4.3.
The PseudoRole function performs the first-step access evaluation by verifying
whether a subject requesting access to an object holds the right pseudorole speci-
fied by the BLAC policy. Each rule has four sub-elements defined as boolean func-
tions specifying the range of values that must be satisfied in terms of the attributes
of subject, object, operation, and environment. The rules are for performing the
second-step access evaluation.
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   <Subject>...</Subject> 
   <Object>...</Object> 
   <Operation>...</Operation> 
   <Environment>...</Environment> 
 </Rule> 
 <!– more rules can be specified 
</policy> 
Figure 4.3: The structure of a BLAC policy, showing the two elements: PseudoRole boolean
function, and a set of one or more rules defined as boolean functions that specify the
range of values that must be satisfied for the subject, object, operation, and environment
attributes.
Using the above-mentioned policy elements, a BLAC policy specification is de-
fined as follows:
Definition 4.3.1. [BLAC Policy Specification]
Let p ∈ P be a BLAC policy that determines whether s can access o. The BLAC policy
specification is defined as p = {PRF,Ru1,. . . ,Run}, such that PRF is PseudoRole boolean
function and Ru1,. . . ,Run are a finite set of access rules. Each Rui = {RF1, . . . ,RFn}, such
that RFi is a set of boolean functions.
To evaluate an access request, the two-step evaluation procedure is performed
by the access decision engine (ADE) in the BLAC model. In the first step, ADE
checks the BLAC policy associated with the requested object to verify whether the
requesting subject has the pseudorole specified in the BLAC policy or not. If the
requesting subject holds the right pseudorole, ADE in the second step checks the
rule(s) within the associated BLAC policy for additional constraints to grant or
deny the access request. Figure 4.4 illustrates the evaluation procedure of BLAC
policies by ADE in the BLAC model.
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Figure 4.4: The two-step evaluation procedure for BLAC policies. First, ADE checks the
BLAC policy associated with the requested object to verify whether the requesting subject
has the pseudorole specified in the BLAC policy or not. If the requesting subject holds the
right pseudorole, ADE in the second step checks the rule(s) within the associated BLAC
policy for additional constraints to grant or deny the access request.
4.4 Informal Validation of BLAC
This section informally validates the practical viability of the BLAC model by ap-
plying it to the healthcare domain. This validation is needed to ensure that the
BLAC model can fulfill its intended main objective mentioned in Chapter 1, that
is, attributes can be used to create an effective access control model while preserv-
ing the advantages of RBAC.
This informal validation of the BLAC model examines each of the core func-
tions of access control identified in Chapter 5 and summarized in Table 5.1. To
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demonstrate these functions, a usage scenario from the relevant healthcare litera-
ture [81, 97] is adopted to define a set of use cases. These use cases are then used
to show that the BLAC model can effectively perform the identified functions.
The use case terminology used here is based on the pattern specifically applied
to access control, both by Oracle [48] and Amazon Web Services [8]. In this ap-
proach, a scenario describes a narrative of common, previously-known interactions
between users and the software system, and use cases are common functions sup-
ported by the system for users. Note that the use case approach is substantially
different from the Unified Modeling Language approach to use cases [24].
The rest of this section describes a typical scenario, as depicted in Figure 4.5, in
the healthcare world that makes use of an EHR system. This scenario is used by
van der Linden et al. [97] to illustrate the sharing of EHRs. The scenario adapted
in this dissertation describes a sequence of actions that require access to informa-
tion in an EHR system. Using the BLAC model, such accesses are intercepted and
examined to enforce access control policies specified by a healthcare organization.
The scenario, however, is slightly adjusted to demonstrate the core functions of
access control, and thus, some examples from Silow-Carroll et al. [81] are adopted.
In the scenario shown in Figure 4.5, five use cases are defined to describe the
complete life-cycle of any access control model including the BLAC model: (1)
subjects join a system, (2) subjects request access, (3) the organization’s policies are
modified, (4) subjects’ permissions are modified, and (5) subjects leave the system.
Each of these use cases is detailed in the following sections. Each section describes
a use case and then shows how the BLAC model implements the use case.
4.4.1 Use Case 1: Subjects Join a System
This section first describes the use case where subjects join a system, and then
illustrates how the BLAC model carries out the use case.
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A patient named Bob lives in a town with a large hospital, ABCA, and sev-
eral general practitioners practices that share relevant health information via
an EHR system. Bob has one specific primary care physician (PCP) whom he
regularly visits and who is fully informed about Bob’s medical history. Bob
visits his PCP for a rash later. The PCP then decides to refer him to the der-
matology department at the hospital for an expert consultation. Bob visits the
dermatologist, who requests an access to his health information to know about
Bob’s allergies and medication. The dermatologist prescribes tablets to treat the
rash. Later on, the hospital implements a new feature in the EHR system al-
lowing only physicians to access the EHR system remotely. A month later, the
dermatologist has been promoted to chair of the dermatology department. One
day, Bob receives a mail stating that his PCP is leaving the practice and Bob is
assigned to a new PCP.
Figure 4.5: Healthcare Scenario. This scenario is used to describe the five use
cases to help validate the practical viability of the BLAC model.
Overview:
From the scenario (as shown in Figure 4.5), the PCP and dermatologist are hired
and are provided access to their patients’ health information via the EHR system.
The PCP can access all of Bob’s health records. The dermatologist can access Bob’s
health records that are related to the dermatology department. Additionally, when
Bob joins the EHR system, he is permitted to access only his health information.
Implementation:
Upon employment, the PCP and dermatologist are assigned appropriate subject
attributes. The subject attributes of the PCP and dermatologist are described in
Table 4.2. They are also assigned pseudoroles in a table that represents the relation
SPR, review the definition of the BLAC model in 4.1, in the BLAC model, as shown
in Table 4.3. In this example, “Provider,” “Department” and “Hospital Affiliation”
are used for generating pseudoroles. Bob’s attributes are provisioned upon his first
visit to the practice; his attributes are shown in Table 4.4.
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First Name Robert Lisa
Last Name Martin John
DoB May 8, 1969 Jan 31, 1964
Gender Male Female
Provider Physician Physician
Job Title Physician Physician
Department Primary Care Dermatology
Specialty Internal Medicine Dermatopathology
Graduation Year 1995 1991
Board Certification Yes Yes
Hospital Affiliation ABCA ABCA
Office Address 3 North Rd. 3 North Rd.
Office Phone 562-6813 638-8735
Office Number 1-581 3-731
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Table 4.3: The table that holds the assignment of subjects to pseudoroles. This table shows
the assignments of PCP and dermatologist to their pseudoroles. The attributes that com-

















   <(subject.provider=“physician”subject.provider=“nurse”)    
       subject.provider=“primaryCare”        
       subject.hospital =“abca”> 
 </PseudoRole> 
 <Rule> 
   <Subject>”any”</Subject> 
   <Object><object.providerID=subject.ID></Object> 
   <Operation><action.type=“read”action.type=“modify”></Operation> 
   <Environment><environment. AccessIP=“192.123.*.*”></Environment> 
 </Rule> 
</policy> 
Figure 4.6: Policy 1. Bob’s EHRs created by his PCP are associated with policy 1, which
allows subjects who hold pseudoroles with the values physician or nurse, primaryCare,
and abca in provider, department, and hospital affiliation respectively. Policy 1 has one
rule allowing any physician or nurse who works for the primary care department in the
ABCA hospital to only read and modify records of their patients as long as the access
request is issued within the hospital’s network.
Upon the creation of Bob’s EHRs, object attributes are assigned and access poli-
cies are specified and associated to these records. Access policies are stored, not
bound to the EHRs, and referenced in a table that represents the relation OBP in the
BLAC model, review the definition of the BLAC model in 4.1. EHRs are defined in
the system using four object attributes: patient name, patient MRN, patient DOB,
and the ID of the provider responsible for treating the patient. Bob’s EHRs cre-
ated by his PCP are associated with Policy 1 shown in Figure 4.6. However, Bob’s
EHRs created by the dermatology department are associated with Policy 2 shown
in Figure 4.7.
4.4.2 Use Case 2: Subjects Request Access
This section describes the use case where subjects request access to objects, and
then shows how the BLAC model carries out the use case.
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   <(subject.provider=“physician”subject.provider=“nurse”)    
       (subject.department=“dermatology” subject.provider=“primaryCare”)        
       subject.hospital =“abca”> 
 </PseudoRole> 
 <Rule> 
   <Subject>”any”</Subject> 
   <Object><object.providerID=subject.ID></Object> 
   <Operation><action.type=“read”action.type=“modify”></Operation> 
   <Environment><environment. AccessIP=“192.123.*.*”></Environment> 
 </Rule> 
</policy> 
Figure 4.7: Policy 2. Bob’s EHRs created by the dermatology department are associated
with policy 2, which allows subjects who hold pseudoroles with the values physician or
nurse, dermatology or primaryCare, and abca in provider, department, and hospital af-
filiation respectively. Policy 2 has one rule allowing any physician or nurse who works
for the dermatology or primary care departments in the ABCA hospital to only read and
modify records of their patients as long as the access request is issued within the hospital’s
network.
Overview:
In the scenario shown in Figure 4.5, the dermatologist requests access to Bob’s
health information to check his current allergies and medication when Bob visits
his practice. Such information is found in the patient demographics record that are
accessible to all physicians and nurses.
Implementation:
The dermatologist requests access to Bob’s demographics record that stores infor-
mation about Bob’s current allergies and medication. This record is associated with
Policy 3 shown in Figure 4.8.
When the dermatologist issues the access request, the ADE in the BLAC model
checks the policy associated with Bob’s demographics record, which is Policy 3.
According to Policy 3 and Table 4.3, the pseudorole of the dermatologist satisfies
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   <(subject.provider=“physician”subject.provider=“nurse”)    
       subject.department=“any”        
       subject.hospital =“abca”> 
 </PseudoRole> 
 <Rule> 
   <Subject>”any”</Subject> 
   <Object>”any”</Object> 
   <Operation><action.type=“read”action.type=“modify”></Operation> 
   <Environment><environment.AccessIP=“192.123.*.*”></Environment> 
 </Rule> 
</policy> 
Figure 4.8: Policy 3. Bob’s demographics record is associated with policy 3, which al-
lows subjects who hold pseudoroles with the values physician or nurse, any, and abca in
provider, department, and hospital affiliation respectively. Policy 3 has one rule allowing
any physician or nurse who works for any department in the ABCA hospital to only read
and modify this record as long as the access request is issued within the hospital’s network.
the PseudoRole boolean function in Policy 3. Thus, the rule is further checked, and
the access request is granted. The dermatologist can now read and modify Bob’s
demographics record.
4.4.3 Use Case 3: Organizational Policies are Modified
This section describes the third use case, that is the organization modifies one or
more of its access policies. The section then shows how the BLAC model carries
out the use case.
Overview:
In the scenario, the hospital implements a new feature in the EHR system allowing
only physicians to access the EHR system remotely. Accordingly, a new access rule
stating that ”Physicians are allowed to remotely access EHRs for patients who are under
their responsibility” is specified and enforced.
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Implementation:
Changes in access policies made by the hospital are handled by updating the rel-
evant policies. Thus, in this use case, system or security administrators use any
policy editor tool to modify all the policies in the system to add the new access
rule. For example, Policy 2 is modified by adding a new rule (the second rule) to
state that ”Physicians are allowed to remotely access EHRs for patients who are under




   <(subject.provider=“physician”subject.provider=“nurse”)    




   <Subject><subject.provider=“physician”></Subject> 
   <Object><object.providerID=subject.ID></Object> 
   <Operation><action.type=“read”action.type=“modify”></Operation> 
   <Environment><environment.AccessIP=“any”></Environment> 
 </Rule> 
 <Rule> 
   <Subject>”any”</Subject> 
   <Object><object.providerID=subject.ID></Object> 
   <Operation><action.type=“read”action.type=“modify”></Operation> 
   <Environment><environment.AccessIP=“192.123.*.*”></Environment> 
 </Rule> 
</policy> 
Figure 4.9: Policy 4. After the hospital has changed one of its access policies allowing only
physicians to remotely access the EHR system, BLAC policies need to be updated. Foe
example, Policy 2 is modified in Policy 4 to include a new rule allowing only physicians to
remotely access (to only read and modify) their patients records via the EHR system.
4.4.4 Use Case 4: Subjects’ Permissions are Modified
This section describes the fourth use case, that is permissions of subjects are mod-
ified. The section then shows how the BLAC model carries out the use case.
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Table 4.5: The implementation of changing the dermatologist’s permissions, and since in
BLAC, subject’s permissions stem from his or her attributes, the implementation requires
only a simple modification to the value of the dermatologist’s attribute, ”Job Title”. The
change is from ”Job Title = Physician” to ”Job Title = Chair”.
(a) The value of the dermatologist’s attribute before the change.
Attributes PCP Dermatologist
Job Title Physician Physician
(b) The value of the dermatologist’s attribute after the change.
Attributes PCP Dermatologist
Job Title Physician Chair
Overview:
From the scenario, the dermatologist has been promoted to chair of the dermatol-
ogy department, thus, his new job title is ”Chair”. Hence, he is given administra-
tive and financial duties that require access to information beyond medical records.
Therefore, his set of permissions need to be updated.
Implementation:
The new change in the dermatologist’s permission requires a simple modification
to the value of the attribute, ”Job Title”. The change is from ”Job Title = Physician” to
”Job Title = Chair”. No adjustments to existing access policies or rules are needed to
grant the obligatory access. Additionally, no modifications to subject membership
into pseudoroles are needed in the SPR relation, according to the definition of the
BLAC model in 4.1. The new change to the attribute job title is shown in Table 4.5.
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4.4.5 Use Case 5: Subjects leave a System
This section describes the fifth use case, that is subjects leave a system. The section
then shows how the BLAC model carries out the use case.
Overview:
In the scenario, the PCP leaves the practice, and thus the PCP can no longer access
Bob’s health records. Bob is assigned to a new PCP. Bob’s new PCP can access all
his health records.
Table 4.6: The implementation of revoking the PCP by deleting the assignment of the PCP
to his pseudorole in the assignment table.








When the PCP leaves the practice, he immediately loses all his privileges to ac-
cess the EHRs of Bob or any other patient. This is accomplished by simply delet-
ing the subject membership into pseudoroles in SPR relation. Thus the table that
represents the relation SPR in the BLAC model that was shown in Table 4.3, has
excluded the assignment of the PCP to his pseudorole as in Table 4.6.
When Bob is assigned to a new PCP, the new PCP can immediately access all
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Bob’s EHRs by making simple modification to the value of Bob’s attribute, Provider.
The change is from the ID of the old PCP to the ID of the new PCP. No modifica-
tions to existing access policies or rules are needed to grant the obligatory access.
4.5 Chapter Summary
RBAC provides simple administration of access privileges, user permissions and
permission review, but demands complex initial role engineering and supports
only predefined and static policies. ABAC, on the other hand, simplifies initial
setup, introduces flexibility and fine-granularity but increases the complexity of
managing privileges and user permission review. These limitations have moti-
vated research into the development of newer access control models that use at-
tributes and policies while preserving RBAC’s strengths, that is the simplicity of
privileges and permissions administration, revocation and user permission review.
Several work have been proposed in this area and their limitations have been dis-
cussed intensively in Chapter 2.
The objective of this chapter is to addresses the problem of advancing access
control models and mechanisms to support the use of attributes and access control
policies while preserving the advantages of RBAC. As a result, the BLAC model
has been proposed. In this model, subject attributes are classified into static and
dynamic based on the frequency of changes made to the attributes’ values. Static
attributes are used to compose pseudoroles that are associated with subjects, and
static and dynamic attributes are used to constrain pseudoroles through the use of
BLAC policies that are associated with objects.
The BLAC model provides bi-layer access control: when an access request is
issued, the pseudorole is checked (first layer), and if the requester has the right pseu-
dorole, the rules within the BLAC policy will be checked further for fine-grained
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constraints (second layer). Although the BLAC model has been validated in the
healthcare context, BLAC is generic and can be used in other domains where
subjects are identified by the use of attributes as in financial services, education
and critical infrastructure protection systems. Systems that require flexible, fine-
grained and effective access control can utilize the BLAC model. The work by
Ashutosh [9] demonstrates how BLAC model and BLAC policies can be developed
for the financial domain.
This chapter has described and defined the BLAC model, discussed the gener-
ation methods of pseudoroles, presented policy specification and evaluation in the
BLAC model, and informally validated the BLAC model via the use of use cases
in the healthcare domain.
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Chapter 5
An Evaluation Framework for Access
Control
The literature survey in Chapter 2 discussed several access control approaches
that have been proposed. However, no well-accepted framework has been de-
signed or developed to compare various access control models, as was observed
by NIST [26].
One exception to this dearth of literature was an attempt to compare access
control models in terms of their expressive power by Tripunitara [90]. Tripuni-
tara’s approach measures the ability of an access control model to represent dif-
ferent access policies. That is, if all policies that can be represented in model A
can be represented in model B, then model B is as expressive as model A. How-
ever, if there a policy that can be represented in A but not B, then model A is more
expressive than model B.
Intuitively, in the context of this dissertation, applying a similar approach to
compare the performance of different access control models would be appealing as
it would permit performance comparison of the BLAC model with the traditional
RBAC and ABAC models. However, this intuitive approach is not useful because
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what works for expressiveness does not work for performance. Due to its use of
pseudoroles and policies for making access decisions, the BLAC model is inherently
as expressive as RBAC and ABAC.
A second exception was a more recent attempt by NIST [28] to identify evalua-
tion metrics to measure the effectiveness of access control models based on features
such as administration, enforcement, performance, and support properties [28].
Although the framework is comprehensive, the metrics used are qualitative.
Given this lack of work in this space, a new framework is needed to analyze
and compare the performance of access control models; this chapter proposes and
defines such an evaluation framework.
5.1 Overview of the Evaluation Framework
This section presents the evaluation framework for analyzing and comparing ac-
cess control models. This framework supports quantitative analysis based on the
identification of core functions of access control, which is therefore likely to lead to
meaningful, numerical results.
This dissertation identifies the following functions to be core to access control
models and they are defined as follows and summarized in Table 5.1.
1. Authorization Decision-Making: the process of evaluating access requests by
access control models to grant or deny requests by subjects to perform oper-
ations on objects.
2. Policy Modification: the process of altering access policies by access control
models to meet the needs of the organization deploying the models.
3. Permission Modification: the process of changing the assigning permissions of
subjects to access objects by access control models.
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Table 5.1: The core access control functions.
Function Description
Authorization Decision-Making Granting or denying access requests
Policy Modification Altering access policies
Permission Modification Adjusting rights of subjects to access objects
Revocation Withdrawing rights of subjects to access objects
Permission Review Determining the set of available permissions for a
particular subject
4. Revocation: the process of deleting all assigning permissions of subjects to
access objects by access control models.
5. Permission Review. The process of determining the set of available permissions
for a particular subject.
Access control models are theoretically analyzed below on the basis of algo-
rithmic efficiency of these five identified functions with respect to time complexity.
The results of these analyses are then used to compare the models.
5.2 Applying the Evaluation Framework
This section applies the framework to RBAC, ABAC and BLAC. The specifications
of the identified functions are based on the NIST model for RBAC [23] and the
XACML v3.0 OASIS Standard [99] for ABAC. The specifications of the identified
functions in RBAC, ABAC, and BLAC are described formally using Z notation [83],
which is a specification language that formally describes and models the behavior
of computing systems based on standard mathematical notation used in set theory
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and first-order predicate logic. The three access control models, RBAC, ABAC, and
BLAC are analyzed next.
5.2.1 Analysis of RBAC
1. Authorization Decision-Making: RBAC makes authorization decisions in ad-
vance as it associates permissions to roles. Thus, when a subject requests an
operation over an object, RBAC checks what role is assigned with this subject,
and if the requested permission (the operation over the object) is associated
with the subject’s role, access is granted; otherwise, access is denied.
The EvalAccess function in RBAC takes as input the requesting subject s, the
requested operation op and the requested object ob, and it returns a Boolean
value presenting the access control decision. The pre-condition for the success
of EvalAccess is that s is a member of S dataset, op is a member of OP dataset,
and ob is a member of OB dataset. The access request by s to perform op over
ob is permitted if perm such that perm ∈ PERM | PERM = P(OP × OB) is
assigned to at least one of roles of s. The active roles assigned to s are checked
to find perm. The set of active roles assigned to s is denoted by aR, such that
aR ∈ {r : R ∧ r ∈ subject roles(s)}.
In the worst case, it is observed that |aR| ≤ |R|, so EvalAccess is O(|R|), how-
ever, in practice |aR|will be a small set. Consequently, the realistic complexity
would be O(|aR|) to make an authorization decision in RBAC.
The following schema formally describes the EvalAccess function.
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s ∈ S; op ∈ OP; ob ∈ OB
result! = (∃ r : R • r ∈ subject roles(s)
∧ ((op, obj) 7→ r) ∈ PA)
2. Policy Modification: RBAC handles changes in policies by updating the sets
of permissions associated with roles in the PA relation without changing per-
missions for each subject.
The ModifyPolicy function in RBAC takes as input op1 and ob1, op2 and ob2,
and r. The ModifyPolicy function is valid only if the pair (op1, ob1) represents
perm ∈ PERM, the pair (op2, ob2) represents perm ∈ PERM, r is a member of
R dataset, and (op1, ob1) is mapped to r in PA. The ModifyPolicy function
revokes the pair (op1, ob1) assigned to r, and then grants r the pair (op2, ob2).
The relation PA is updated accordingly.
In the worst case, the ModifyPolicy function is assumed to go through the
complete set of R in the relation PA to find (op1, ob1) 7→ r) to be updated.
Thus, ModifyPolicy is O(|R|) in the relation PA.
The following schema formally describes the ModifyPolicy function.
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(op1, ob1) ∈ PERM; (op2, ob2) ∈ PERM;
r ∈ R; ((op1, ob1) 7→ r) ∈ PA
PA′ = PA \ {(op1, ob1) 7→ r}
PA′ = PA ∪ {(op2, ob2) 7→ r}
3. Permission Modification: RBAC handles the change of subject permissions by
modifying subject membership into roles in the SA relation. When subject
permissions change, the subject is revoked from the current role and a new
subject membership can be established based on the new access requirements.
The PermissionModify function takes as input r1, r2, and s. The Permission-
Modify function is valid if r1 and r2 are member of R dataset, s is a member of
S dataset, and s is mapped to r1 and not mapped to r2 in the relation SA. The
PermissionModify function deletes the assignment of s to r1, and establishes
a new assignment of s to r2. The relation SA is updated accordingly.
In the worst case, the ModifyPermission function is assumed to go through
the complete set of S in the relation SA to find the assignment of (s 7→ r1) to
be updated. Thus, PermissionModify is O(|S|) in the relation SA.
The following schema formally describes the ModifyPermission function.
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r1 ∈ R; r2 ∈ R; s ∈ S;
(s 7→ r1) ∈ SA; (s 7→ r2) 6∈ SA
SA′ = SA \ {s 7→ r1}
SA′ = SA ∪ {s 7→ r2}
4. Revocation: RBAC handles subject revocation by revoking the subject mem-
bership into roles. When a subject is revoked, the subject is de-assigned from
all the assigned roles in SA relation.
The RevokeSubject function takes as an input the revoked subject s. The
function is successful if and only if s is a member of S datasets. The Revoke-
Subject function performs subject revocation by deleting all s 7→ r in SA.
In the worst case, the RevokeSubject function is assumed to go through the
complete set of S in the relation SA to find all the (s 7→ r1) assignments to be
deleted. Thus, RevokeSubject is O(|S|) in the relation SA.




(∀ r : R • r ∈ subject roles(s)⇒
SA′ = SA \ {s 7→ r})
5. Permission Review: RBAC simplifies reviewing the available set of permissions
assigned to a single subject. Permission review can be achieved by checking
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the set of permissions associated with the roles assigned to the subject.
ReviewPermission takes as an input s, and returns the set of permissions
assigned to the roles of a particular subject. ReviewPermission is valid if s is a
member of S datasets. ReviewPermission performs permission reviewability
by finding all pairs (op, ob) that represent perm ∈ PERM such that s 7→ r ∈ SA
and (op, ob) 7→ r) ∈ PA hold. ReviewPermission accordingly is O(|S| × |R|).





(r : R; op ∈ OP; ob ∈ OB | (s 7→ r) ∈ SA ∧
((op, ob) 7→ r) ∈ PA)
5.2.2 Analysis of ABAC
1. Authorization Decision-Making: ABAC makes access decisions at the time of
requests as it compares the attributes associated with the requester against all
applicable policies. If the policies are satisfied with the subject attributes, ac-
cess is granted; otherwise, access is denied. When a subject makes an access
request, ADE in the ABAC model checks each policy in the policy store if it
applies to the request. Finally, all applicable policies will be evaluated. The
time taken to find the set of applicable policies depends on the implemented
policy indexing techniques. Approaches for policy indexing are outside the
scope of this work; however, description of these approaches have been dis-
cussed in the XACML v3.0 OASIS Standard [99]. Rule evaluation is based on
the rule combining algorithm specified in a rule-combining algorithm-identifier
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of the specified rule-combining algorithms. XACML defines and describes
12 rule combining algorithms [99] which are used to resolve the results of
the rules within each policy. To facilitate the analysis of the BLAC model
(as discussed in the next subsection) and contrast it with ABAC, the chosen
rule-combining algorithm is the permit-overrides function. The intention be-
hind this choice is the need to compare ABAC with BLAC, and in the BLAC
model, rules within a policy of the requested object are evaluated similarly to
the permit-overrides function in XACML.
The EvalAccess function in ABAC takes as input the requesting subject s, the
requested operation op, the requested object ob, and returns a Boolean value
presenting the access control decision. The EvalAccess function is valid if s is
a member of S dataset, op is a member of OP dataset, and ob is a member of
OB dataset. The access request by s to perform op over ob is permitted when
Ru exists such that it belongs to an applicable p ∈ P and is evaluated to true.
In the worst case, all the rules Ru in p are evaluated, and all p that are appli-
cable are evaluated. Thus, EvalAccess is O(|P||Ru|); however, in practice |P|
will likely be a small set that defines the set of applicable policies.






s ∈ S; op ∈ OP; ob ∈ OB
result! = (∀ p ∈ P • is applicable(p, s)⇒
(∃Ru • is belonged(p) ∧ evaluate(Ru)))
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2. Policy Modification: The process of modifying policies in ABAC is intricate
and usually needs human intervention. The maximum number of policies
that needs to be modified in ABAC is up to 2n where n is the number of
attributes used to compose policies. Practically, however, the real number of
policies that may need to be changed is small and manageable, and the need
to change the complete set of policies is likely to be infrequent.
3. Permission Modification: ABAC allows access control decisions to depend on
attributes and policies. Thus, permissions are derived directly from the at-
tributes. In other words, in ABAC, if a subject changes his position, only his
attribute Position needs to capture the new change. Thus, the complexity of
modifying permissions in ABAC is O(1).
4. Revocation: Subject revocation can be accomplished by de-provisioning at-
tribute assignments to subjects. However, this is not desirable in situations
when a subject’s information still needed to be stored. Accordingly, the pro-
cess of subject revocation in RBAC is not yet well-defined.
5. Permission Review: The process of reviewing permissions for a given subject
in ABAC is intricate as all policies need to be reviewed. For reasons similar to
those stated above, the number of policies can reach 2n where n is the number
of attributes used to compose policies.
5.2.3 Analysis of BLAC
1. Authorization Decision-Making: BLAC, similar to ABAC, makes access deci-
sions at the time of requests. When a subject requests an access, BLAC first
checks the pseudorole associated with the subject, and then compares it with
the pseudorole included in the policy associated with the requested object,
not each policy in the policy store as in ABAC. If the policy is satisfied with
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the subject’s pseudorole, BLAC further checks the rules within the policy. If
one of the rules returns true, then access is granted; otherwise, access is de-
nied.
The EvalAccess function in BLAC takes as input the requesting subject s, the
requested operation op, the requested object ob, and returns a Boolean value
presenting the access control decision. The EvalAccess function is valid if s is
a member of S dataset, op is a member of OP dataset, and ob is a member of
OB dataset. The access request by s to perform op over ob is permitted if PRF
in p of ob is satisfied by pr of s, and at least one Ru is evaluated to true.
In the worst case, all the rules Ru in p are evaluated; thus, EvalAccess is
O(|Ru|).






s ∈ S; op ∈ OP; ob ∈ OB
result! = (∃ p ∈ P • p = object policy(ob))⇒
(∃ pr ∈ PR • pr = subject pseudorole(s) ∧
is satisfied(pr,PRF)) ∧
(∃Ru • evaluate(Ru)))
2. Policy Modification: BLAC, similarly to ABAC, handles the changes in policies
by updating or revoking the policies that are associated with the relevant
objects by humans. The number of policies that need to be modified in BLAC
may reach | OB |. However, in practice, the actual number of policies that
may need to be changed is likely to be small and manageable.
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3. Permission Modification: Modifying permissions in BLAC, on the other hand,
is slightly different from ABAC. BLAC allows the use of pseudoroles, at-
tributes, and policies for making access control decisions. However, it is im-
portant to consider the type of attributes used for generating pseudoroles;
hence, the values of these attributes should hardly change as discussed in 4.2.
Thus, the complexity of modifying permissions in BLAC depends on the at-
tribute that needs to be changed. If the attribute is not a member of the pseu-
dorole, the complexity is O(1) as the attribute’s value needs to be changed to
reflect the new change. If the attribute is a member of the pseudorole, the
complexity is based on the ModifyPermission function as described in the
following paragraphs.
The PermissionModify function takes as input pr1, pr2, and s and is valid if
pr1 and pr2 are member of PR dataset, s is a member of S dataset, and s is
mapped to pr1 and not mapped to pr2 in the relation SPR. The Permission-
Modify function deletes the assignment of s to pr1, and establishes a new
assignment of s to pr2. The relation SPR is updated accordingly.
In the worst case, the ModifyPermission function is assumed to go through
the complete set of S in the relation SPR to find the assignment of (s 7→ pr1)
to be updated. Thus, PermissionModify is O(|S|) in the relation SPR.





pr1 ∈ PR; pr2 ∈ PR; s ∈ S;
(s 7→ pr1) ∈ SPR; (s 7→ pr2) 6∈ SPR
SPR′ = SPR \ {s 7→ pr1}
SPR′ = SPR ∪ {s 7→ pr2}
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4. Revocation: BLAC handles subject revocation by simply de-assigning the sub-
ject from the assigned pseudorole in SPR relation.
The RevokeSubject function takes as an input the revoked subject s and is
valid if and only if s is a member of S dataset. The RevokeSubject function
perform subject revocation by deleting the s 7→ pr in SPR.
In the worst case, the RevokeSubject function is assumed to go through the
complete set of S in SPR to find s, and thus, RevokeSubject is O(|S|).




(∃ pr : PR • pr ∈ subject pseudoroles(s) ∧
SPR′ = SPR \ {s 7→ pr})
5. Permission Review: BLAC handles the process of permission review by only re-
viewing the set of policies where the pseudoroles within these policies match
the pseudorole of the subject.
The ReviewPermission function takes as an input s, and returns the set of
policies that represents the authorized privileges of s. The ReviewPermission
function is valid if s is a member of S datasets.
ReviewPermission evaluates the complete set of P to compare PRF functions
in p ∈ P with pr assigned to s. ReviewPermission is O(|P|), and in BLAC, |P|
= |OB|, thus ReviewPermission is O(|OB|).
The following schema formally describes the ReviewPermission function.
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(∀ p ∈ P | (∃ pr ∈ PR •
pr = subject pseudorole(s)
∧ is satisfied(pr,PRF))
5.3 Comparing Access Control Models
The evaluation framework can now be used to quantify the strengths and weak-
nesses of each model. This section compares the BLAC model against RBAC and
ABAC separately because of the lack of component similarity between RBAC and
ABAC as RBAC uses roles and ABAC uses attributes. Therefore, RBAC is com-
pared against BLAC in Section 5.3.1, and ABAC is compared against BLAC in Sec-
tion 5.3.2. Table 5.2 summaries the comparison results across the three access con-
trol models for the sake of clarity in comparing the results. The highlighted values
indicate the best performance. Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 summarize the comparison
results respectively.
5.3.1 RBAC vs BLAC
To compare the time complexity of access evaluation algorithms of RBAC and
BLAC, it is assumed that |aR| assigned to a subject in RBAC is fewer than |Ru|
in a BLAC’s policy. However, considering the high granularity provided by BLAC
when compared to RBAC, the difference in the time complexity is insignificant. On
the other hand, a proper comparison of the time complexity of access evaluation
algorithms of RBAC and BLAC needs to consider coarse-grained access control.
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Table 5.2: Summary of the time complexity of the main access control functions for RBAC




RBAC BLAC ABAC BLAC
O(|aR|) O(1) Authorization Decision-Making O(|P||Ru|) O(|Ru|)
O(|R|) |OB| Policy Modification |P*| |P**|
O(|S|) O(1) Permission Modification O(1) O(1)
O(|S|) O(|S|) Revocation undefined O(|S|)
O(|S||R|) O(|OB|) Permission Review |P*| |P**|
*P ≈ 2n **P ≈ OB
Due to the need to evaluate a single pseuodrole for each access request, the time
complexity of BLAC would be O(1) and that of RBAC would be O(|aR|).
Considering the policy modification algorithms of RBAC and BLAC, RBAC
performs better than BLAC. RBAC is O(|R|), and can be made to perform even
better depending on the data structures used to store R and/or the searching algo-
rithm used to find r ∈ R. On the other hand, BLAC needs human intervention for
policy modification.
Permission modification is flexible in BLAC due to its use of attributes. As-
suming changes in permissions do not affect attributes that are used to generate
pseudoroles, and because permissions are derived directly from attributes, the
time complexity for modifying permissions in BLAC is O(|1|). However, RBAC
is O(|S|) due to its need to modify the assignment of s 7→ r1 in SA relation.
Due to the use of pseudoroles in BLAC and roles in RBAC, the time complexity
of subject revocation algorithms in both models isO(|S|) as RBAC and BLAC need
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to delete the assignment of all s 7→ r in SA in RBAC and s 7→ pr in SPR in BLAC.
The process of permission review in RBAC is simpler and can be quantified as
O(|S| × |R|). In BLAC, and due to the use of policies for making access decisions,
reviewing the set of permissions for a particular subject needs to compare a sub-
ject’s pseudorole against all pseudoRoles functions in the policies associated with
objects. It is quantified asO(|OB|). The product of the number of subjects and roles
in a system is much fewer than objects. Permission review is possible in BLAC, as
in RBAC, but causes additional overhead.
Table 5.3: Summary of the time complexity of the core access control functions in RBAC
and BLAC.
Characteristic RBAC BLAC
Authorization Decision-Making O(|aR|) O(1)
Policy Modification O(|R|) |OB|
Permission Modification O(|S|) O(1)
Revocation O(|S|) O(|S|)
Permission Review O(|S||R|) O(|OB|)
5.3.2 ABAC vs. BLAC
The time complexity of the ABAC access evaluation algorithm depends on the
process of finding the set of applicable policies among the complete list of policies,
and the number of applicable policies and rules that need to be evaluated. Here,
it is assumed that the algorithm uses policy indexing techniques. Thus, the time
complexity is limited to the process of evaluating policies and rules within these
policies, which is O(|P||Ru|).
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On the other hand, BLAC evaluates a single policy that is associated to the re-
quested object; thus, time complexity is limited to the process of evaluating the as-
sociated policy and the rules within this policy, which is O(|Ru|). BLAC performs
well compared to ABAC as it only needs to evaluate a single policy. Assuming
there are ten 1-rule policies in ABAC and a single 10-rule policy in BLAC that need
to be evaluated, BLAC performs better than ABAC because ABAC needs to com-
bine individual decisions into a single aggregated decision by policy-combining
algorithms [99] which BLAC does not need to do.
In both ABAC and BLAC, modifying policies needs human intervention. Al-
though the number of policies to modify in both model can be up to 2n in ABAC
and | OB | in BLAC, there is no significant difference between the two models.
Also, in practice, the number of policies that may need to be modified is usually
small and manageable, and the need to update the complete set of policies is small.
Permission modification is flexible in both ABAC and BLAC due to the use
of attributes, thus it is O(|1|) in both models. In short, there is no noteworthy
difference between the two models.
Subject revocation in ABAC is not a well-defined process, which makes it dif-
ficult to quantify time complexity. On the other hand, the process is well-defined
in BLAC due to the use of pseudoroles which can be quantified to O(|S|) to delete
the assignment of s 7→ pr in SPR.
The process of permission review in BLAC has an overhead which is similar to
ABAC’s. In BLAC, reviewing the set of permissions for a particular subject needs
to compare subject’s pseudorole against all PRF functions in the policies; thus, it
can be quantified as O(|OB|). In ABAC, all policies need to be executed to review
the set of permissions of a single subject.
From the previous discussion, note that the comparison between ABAC and
BLAC is primarily based on the number of polices in both models.
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Table 5.4: Summary of the time complexity of the core access control functions in ABAC
and BLAC.
Characteristic ABAC BLAC
Authorization Decision-Making O(|P||Ru|) O(|Ru|)
Policy Modification |P| |P|
Permission Modification O(1) O(1)
Revocation undefined O(|S|)
Permission Review |P| |P|
A realistic assumption for a medium-sized enterprise is based on the Rochester
General Hospital System (RGHS), which is a hospital system in Monroe County,
New York [69]. Here it makes sense to assume there are up to 10,000 subjects
(users) and 100 million objects that need to be accessed. For such an enterprise,
the following three cases need to be considered for the range in the numbers of
policies for ABAC: small, medium and large; the discussion below provided the
numbers of policies for BLAC.
The following three sub-sections present assumptions about attributes, gener-
ate appropriate numbers of policies in ABAC and BLAC, and then compare ABAC
against BLAC based on these assumptions.
Small number of ABAC policies
Assumptions. A system here may be assumed to have up to 10 attributes: four
subject attributes, two object attributes, two operation attributes and two environ-
ment attributes. Under ABAC, this set of attributes could result in up to 210 polices,
i.e., 1,024 polices. However, under BLAC, the number of policies is 100 million
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assuming that each object has a distinct policy; however, this assumption is im-
practical as in the healthcare domain multiple health records have the same access
permissions. Polices in both models are assumed to have one rule for consistency.
Comparison between ABAC and BLAC. In ABAC, the time complexity of the ac-
cess evaluation algorithm focuses on the evaluation of the applicable policies and
rules within these policies. Thus, in the worst case, the time complexity isO (1024)
because all the policies are considered applicable and need to be evaluated. In
BLAC, the time complexity of access evaluation algorithm is limited to the pro-
cess of evaluating the single distinct associated policy, thus, it is O(1). Noticeably,
BLAC outperforms ABAC because it only needs to evaluate a single policy.
In ABAC, the number of policies that may need to be modified is 1024. On
the other hand, the number of polices in BLAC is 108. In practice, however, the
number of policies that may need to be modified is usually small and manageable,
and the need to update the complete set of policies is rare. On the other hand,
ABAC outperforms BLAC when it comes to modifying polices.
In ABAC, the number of policies that may need to be reviewed to find the set of
permissions for a particular subject is 1024 because all policies need to be checked.
In the worst case for BLAC, the time complexity is O(108) because all policies may
be assumed to be satisfied with the specified subject’s pseudorole. ABAC thus
outperforms BLAC in the review of the set of permissions for a particular subject.
Medium Number of ABAC Policies
Assumptions. For this case, assume a system had 30 attributes: 15 subject at-
tributes, five object attributes, five operation attributes and five environment at-
tributes. Under ABAC, this set of attributes may result in up to 230 polices, i.e.,
1.073e9 polices. Under BLAC, the number of policies is 100 million based on the
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same assumptions as in the first case.
Comparison between ABAC and BLAC. In ABAC, the time complexity of access
evaluation algorithm is O(230). In BLAC, the time complexity of access evaluation
algorithm is again O(1). BLAC outperforms ABAC due to the need to evaluate a
single policy.
The number of policies that may need to be modified is (230) in ABAC and (108)
in BLAC. Again, BLAC outperforms ABAC in modifying polices.
The number of policies that may need to be reviewed to find the set of per-
missions for a particular subject is (230) in ABAC and (108) in BLAC. Thus, BLAC
notably outperforms ABAC in reviewing the set of permissions for a particular
subject.
Large Number of ABAC Policies
Assumptions. Here consider a system with 100 attributes: 75 subject attributes, 10
object attributes, five operation attributes and 10 environment attributes. Under
ABAC, this set of attributes could result in 2100 polices, i.e. 1.267e30 polices. Under
BLAC, the number of policies is 100 million based on the same assumptions as in
the first two cases.
Comparison between ABAC and BLAC. In ABAC, the time complexity of access
evaluation algorithm isO(2100). In BLAC, the time complexity of access evaluation
algorithm is again O(1). BLAC significantly outperforms ABAC because it only
needs to evaluate a single policy.
The number of policies that may need to be modified is (2100) in ABAC and
(108) in BLAC. Again, BLAC significantly outperforms ABAC in modifying the set
of polices.
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The number of policies that may need to be reviewed to find the set of permis-
sions for a particular subject is (2100) in ABAC and (108) in BLAC. Thus, BLAC
significantly outperforms ABAC in reviewing the set of permissions for a particu-
lar subject.
5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter examined the performance of the BLAC model. For this purpose, an
evaluation framework was proposed to theoretically evaluate and compare access
control models using five core functions of access control. The framework was
used to evaluate RBAC, ABAC, and BLAC based on time complexity. The results
of these evaluations were then used to compare the BLAC model against RBAC
and BLAC.
As detailed in Section 5.3, the BLAC model outperforms RBAC in terms of
authorization decision-making and permission modification, and performs com-
parably to RBAC in revocation. Due to the use of policies in BLAC, however,
RBAC outperforms BLAC in policy modification and user permission review. On
the other hand, the BLAC model outperforms ABAC in terms of authorization
decision-making and revocation, and performs comparably to ABAC in policy and
permission modification and user permission review.
In this chapter, the focus was a theoretical analysis and comparison for the effi-
ciency of various algorithms underlying access control models. Another possible
approach is to model and implement/simulate systems based on the model, and
subsequently compare the implementation/simulation based on the running time
of the identified functions or algorithms. For example, the running time to evalu-
ate access requests or the time to update permissions of subjects. This approach,
however, is difficult to justify because the best way to implement such models is
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not known and thus the results need to be proved [90]. Moreover, to make a real-
istic empirical comparison, all models have to be implemented or simulated using
identical enterprise-level parameters, which is beyond the scope of this disserta-
tion. A theoretical comparison based on time complexity, as shown here, remains
the most appropriate approach for this dissertation.
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Chapter 6
An Insider Threat Model for Access
Control
As discussed earlier, information sharing has become crucial in modern comput-
ing applications in a variety of domains. For example, in the healthcare domain,
the United States Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act (HITECH) of 2009 encourages healthcare providers to share information with
one another, as well as patients, for improving healthcare quality and lowering
costs [93]. These benefits of sharing information need to be balanced with secu-
rity and privacy concerns, especially when personally identifiable information is
involved. HIPAA and GLBA specify strict requirements for the protection of in-
formation [21, 94]. A major requirement specified by HIPAA and GLBA is access
control.
The increase in reported incidents of successful insider attacks shows that cur-
rently deployed access control mechanisms are inadequate in protecting against
such attacks. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse tracks data breaches [65] that typ-
ically have compromised data elements such as social security numbers, account
numbers, and driver’s license numbers that can be exploited by rogue insiders.
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These reported breaches are categorized by organization types such as healthcare,
educational institutions, government and military, businesses (retail, financial, and
other) and non-profits [65].
The healthcare domain is particularly sensitive and it receives more than its
share of attacks, especially from insiders. In a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of
more than 600 healthcare providers, insurers, pharmaceuticals, and life sciences
professionals, 40% reported an improper use of protected health information by
internal parties [66]. A recent report [67] stated that U.S. and German compa-
nies experience the most expensive data breach incidents while Brazil and India
had the least costly data breaches. Several other reported healthcare information
breaches by insiders [20, 58, 70, 98] have cost healthcare organizations in penalties
between $50,000 for one-time violations to $1.5 million for repeat violations across
all HIPAA violation categories [44].
The ease and frequency of such inappropriate accesses compels an examina-
tion of traditional and current approaches used for access control in healthcare
systems, and particularly how these approaches handle threats and attacks, espe-
cially from insiders. The impact of insider attacks can be significantly worse than
that of outsider attacks [3, 12]. One major reason is that insiders already have au-
thorized credentials that allow them some level of access within an organization,
thus leading to easier opportunities to cause damage. One approach of assessing
how current access control mechanisms mitigate insider threats is evaluating these
methods against an insider threat model.
Given the lack of a formal threat model designed specifically for access con-
trol, this chapter introduces an insider threat model based on a holistic approach
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toward modeling access control in systems. Threat modeling is a process for un-
derstanding and analyzing the security of a system by following a systematic ap-
proach to identify potential security threats to the system [30, 85]. Given the sen-
stivity of healthcare data, this model is constructed in the context of a healthcare
application, but the threat model itself is sufficiently general and can be applied to
access control as used in other domains. The chapter also provides an assessment
of how the constructed insider threat model performs against the two major access
control models, Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC), as well as a new access control model, BiLayer Access Control
model (BLAC) [7], that was proposed to combine the best features of RBAC and
ABAC.
The rest of this chapter summarizes the background in threat model method-
ologies, designs and constructs an insider threat model for access control in health-
care systems, and uses the constructed threat model to assess the effectiveness of
access control approaches for mitigating insider threats.
6.1 Threat Modeling Methodologies
This section reviews the related methodologies in the threat modeling area. Threat
modeling helps to address top threats that may have the biggest potential to im-
pact a system. Several threat modeling methodologies exist to construct threat
models, including Microsoft Threat Modeling Methodology [50], Microsoft Threat
Modeling for Web Applications [51], OWASP Application Threat Modeling [88],
Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis (PASTA) [45], and Trike [60].
Microsoft Threat Modeling Methodology [50] and OWASP Application Threat
Modeling [88] start with identifying assets that could attract attackers, understand-
ing the target application by creating use-cases to understand how the application
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could be used, identifying entry points to determine how attackers could interact
with the application, and analyzing data flow diagrams (DFDs) to demonstrate
how data travels through the different paths in the application. Next, potential
threats are identified using a threat categorization methodology such as Microsoft
STRIDE model [52], or the Application Security Frame (ASF) [53].
PASTA [45], and Trike [60] differ from Microsoft and OWASP threat model-
ing. The former identifies business objectives and security and compliance re-
quirements, and the latter takes risks into perspective. In this work, the Microsoft
Threat Modeling Methodology [50] was adopted for constructing the insider threat
model, because it was the most suitable method for access control mechanisms.
6.2 Threat Model Construction
This section presents the threat model for the generic access control system. The
main objective for constructing the threat model in this chapter is to help improve
the security of applications from the perspective of access control. To explain the
threat model construction process, a healthcare application is used. However, the
approach used to construct this threat model is sufficiently general.
The focus of concern in this threat model being constructed here is the pro-
tection of patient healthcare data from unauthorized or improper use and disclo-
sure (confidentiality), and unauthorized or improper modification and destruction
(integrity) by healthcare providers. Patient healthcare data, as used here, primar-
ily refers to electronic protected health information (e-PHI), as described in the
HIPAA Security Rule [92], that is created, received, maintained or transmitted in
an electronic form by healthcare providers.
The use of healthcare data is defined by HIPAA as the sharing, employment,
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application, utilization, examination, or analysis of protected healthcare informa-
tion within organizations that maintain such information [95]. HIPAA specifically
defines the disclosure of healthcare data as “the release, transfer, provision of, ac-
cess to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding
the information” [95]. The ability to carry out operations over e-PHI, including the
use, disclosure, modification and destruction, is denoted as access [96].
Access to healthcare data is classified as authorized and unauthorized based
on a set of access policies defined by healthcare organizations or healthcare laws
and regulations. Authorized access in turn can be, however, classified as either
proper or improper. More formal definitions of these terms are provided below,







Figure 6.1: The classification of access in healthcare applications showing the two main
type of access: authorized access (white area) unauthorized access (patterned area) based
on access policies. Authorized access are further classified to proper and improper access.
• Authorized access: healthcare providers have access rights to healthcare data
according to the set of security policies enforced by a healthcare application.
• Unauthorized access: healthcare providers have no access rights to the data,
but have deliberately circumvented the application to gain access.
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• Improper access: healthcare providers have access rights to the data granted
to them by the application, but have used their access to perform operations
they are not truly entitled to.
As the focus is on insider attackers, the main adversaries are the authorized
users, i.e., insiders, who have some level of authority to access data depending
on their identity attributes, and the security policies specified by their healthcare
organization.
The following paragraphs present and describe the steps to generate the threat
model.
1. Identifying the security objective
This step permits the model builder to focus on the process of constructing the
threat model. The main security goal of this threat model is to minimize unau-
thorized and improper use, disclosure, modification, and destruction of patient
healthcare data by insiders, based on a set of access policies defined by healthcare
organizations and healthcare laws and regulations.
2. Creating the application overview
This step permits the model builder to understand the main functionalities and
subjects of the target application. Identified here are the application architecture
including the application key components, main usage scenarios, roles of subjects,
and how the application components interact with each other and with external
entities, i.e., healthcare providers. Based on the purpose of the threat model, the
identification of these items is tied to the access control.
The overall architecture of a general healthcare application implementing a
generic access control model is illustrated in Figure 6.2. To understand the tar-
get healthcare application fully, a use case from the healthcare domain is defined to
describe the main usage scenarios and roles of subjects.
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Figure 6.2: A general architecture of a healthcare application implementing a generic ac-
cess control model.
In a medical center with two hospital affiliates, hospital A and hospital B, mul-
tiple healthcare providers use a healthcare application called “cHealth” to manage
patients’ healthcare data in both hospitals. The roles of healthcare providers can
be physicians, nurses, and administrative and billing staff, in addition to applica-
tion administrators to maintain the application and access polices. Each healthcare
provider is defined by a set of attributes, for example name, identification number
(ID), gender, the field of the healthcare provider, their department, and their office
location. These attributes are stored in a database.
Healthcare data is stored in another database in a file-based form that conforms
to XML specifications. Healthcare data is defined by attributes, for example, pa-
tient name, patient MRN (Medical Record Number), patient DOB (Date of Birth),
and the ID of the physician responsible for treating the patient. These attributes
are also stored in a database. User and data attributes are typically provided and
managed by trusted entities, however, managing attributes is out of scope for this
dissertation. Healthcare data is organized into a hierarchical data structure: (1)
demographical, (2) clinical, and (3) billing, to provide fine-grained access control.
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Typical usage scenarios are identified below to describe cHealth characteristics.
• Physicians and nurses create, read, and modify the demographical and clin-
ical sections for patients who are under their responsibility in normal situa-
tions, with the exception of psychotherapy notes.
• Physicians and nurses create, read, and modify the demographical and clin-
ical sections for non-patients in emergency situations, with the exception of
psychotherapy notes.
• Healthcare providers do not delete data in any section.
• Administrative staff create, read, and modify data within the demographical
section when they are on duty.
• Billing staff create, read, and modify data within the billing section and read
data within the demographical section when they are on duty.
• Application administrators delete data after a predefined time.
• Healthcare providers generate access policies for the newly created data.
• Application administrators modify access policies for the created data.
Healthcare providers are entitled to access patient healthcare data through their
web browsers based on their identity attributes, and according to their organiza-
tions’ policies. The interactions among components of the cHealth application and
healthcare providers are controlled by the access control model to grant or deny
access requests. These interactions are described in Figure 6.3, and listed below.
1. Subject logs in and requests data through cHealth Web Application.
2. cHealth Web Application creates a web request and sends it to Access Deci-
sion Engine.
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3. Access Decision Engine retrieves relevant policies.
4. Access Decision Engine retrieves attribute values related to subject, data, or
environment.
5. Access Decision Engine makes access decision based on the access control
model, and sends access decision to cHealth Web Application.
6. cHealth Web Application enforces authorization decision: if accept, cHealth
Web Application permits subject to access and perform requested operation
over requested data via cHealth Web Service (6a). If deny, cHealth Web Ap-






























































Figure 6.3: The interactions among the components of access models start when a subject
logs in and requests data through the application, then the application sends the request to
the ADE which retrieves relevant policies and attributes. The ADE makes an access-control
decision and sends the decision to the application for enforcement: if accept, subject is
forwarded to the web service.
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3. Decomposing the healthcare application
This step helps the model builder understand the target application in detail and
how the internal components interact with one another and with external enti-
ties. The data flows and entry and exit points within the healthcare application are
identified.
Figure 6.4 shows a high-level data flow diagram (DFD) between the application
components. The purpose of the DFD is to understand how data is processed
within the internal components. The rectangles denote external entities, and circles
represent functions performed on data, or performed on other functions based on
data. The two parallel lines and curved and directional arrows indicate databases
and data movement. The curved and dashed arrows represent trust boundaries
that refer to changes in access control levels as data flows through the application.
Entry and exit points refer to the interfaces that external entities use to inter-
act with the application to send requests, process data, respond to requests, or
send data. In the healthcare application, the page that subjects use to log in to the
cHealth Application before requesting data access is considered an entry point. It
is denoted as the first step in the interaction process based on the access control
model illustrated in Figure 6.3.
The cHealth main page is an entry and exit point for all successfully logged-
in subjects to carry out one or more of the usage scenarios identified earlier. As
the goal of the desired threat model is to identify threats posed by insiders, the
cHealth main page is the only point considered as it is controlled by the access
control model in order for the subjects to perform operations over data.
4. Identifying the threats
This step permits the model builder to identify relevant threats that may compro-
mise the security objective. Generating an attack tree is a method of representing
threats against an application in a graphical or outline form [76]. An attack tree
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Figure 6.4: The data flow diagram showing how the data processed within the internal
components. Rectangles, circles, two parallel lines, curved and directional arrows, and
curved and dashed arrows denote external entities, functions, databases, data movement,
and trust boundaries respectively.
consists of a root node and child nodes, where the root node denotes a threat, and
child nodes represent various methods to realize that threat. An outline for the
attack tree for the healthcare application security objective is shown in Figure 6.5.
The construction of the threat model results in the effective identification of
a set of threats and alternative approaches used to launch these threats that are
relevant to the security objective. In the next section, access control models are
briefly assessed against the identified threats to test their efficacy in mitigating the
risk of insider threats.
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Threat 1: Unauthorized access of health information (use, disclosure, alteration, 
and destruction) by healthcare providers    
1.1: Gain authorized healthcare provider’s credentials 
1.1.1: Ask for authorized healthcare provider’s credentials 
1.1.1.1: Ask for a temporary use of password 
1.1.1.2: Corporate with an authorized healthcare provider 
1.1.1.3: Fool an authorized healthcare provider to leak credentials 
1.1.2: Steal authorized healthcare provider’s credentials 
1.1.2.1: Phishing 
1.1.2.1.1: Email  
1.1.2.1.2: Fake website  
1.1.2.2: Implant malware  
1.1.2.3: Install keystroke hardware 
1.1.2.4: Shoulder surfing   
1.2: Obtain access credentials 
1.2.1: Brute Force 
1.2.2: Use default credentials 
1.2.3: SQL injection 
1.2.4: Monitor network traffic  
1.3: Use unattended logged-in machine 
1.4: Steal authorized healthcare provider’s machine 
Threat 2: Improper access of health information (use, disclosure, alteration, and 
destruction) by healthcare providers  
2.1: Use their own credentials 
Figure 6.5: The generated attack tree showing two identified threats: unauthorized access
of data with four various methods to launch it, and improper access of data with one
method to launch it.
6.3 Access Control Models Assessment
This section evaluates how the three access control approaches, RBAC, ABAC and
BLAC, perform against the identified threats by insiders (i.e., healthcare providers
themselves). Two fundamental types of threats exist: (1) unauthorized access of
information, and (2) improper access of information. Access again refers to the set
of operations—the use, disclosure, alteration, and destruction of data—that health-
care providers may perform without authorization or improperly over healthcare
information.
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6.3.1 Evaluating Access Control Models Against Unauthorized Access Threat
Healthcare providers, or attackers, can gain unauthorized access to healthcare in-
formation via several methods. Note that the same methods can also be carried out
by outsiders, i.e., unauthorized users who have no access to data but try to gain
such access by illegitimate means; however, the focus here is on attacks launched
by insiders.
Insiders may obtain credentials from legitimate healthcare providers who are
authorized to access the target healthcare information in several ways including:
• Asking for and obtaining credentials from authorized users,
• Using authorized users’ unattended logged-in machines, or
• Stealing or illegally obtaining credentials from authorized users,
• Stealing devices that contain the credentials of authorized users, and
• Stealing devices or storage that contains the target protected heath informa-
tion.
In these cases, the insiders are able to break the authentication scheme being used.
That is, the application maps these insiders (attackers) to the identity attributes
associated with the authorized healthcare providers. If the attributes associated
with authorized providers, along with the attributes associated with the object, ac-
tion, and environment, satisfy the policy of the target healthcare information being
attacked, the attackers (insiders) would be able to access the target information.
In other words, the strength of the access control model to guard against unau-
thorized access depends on the robustness of the authentication scheme being
used. Due to their utilization of attributes, ABAC and BLAC will be able to pre-
vent attacks as the attacker can only spoof subjects, but not attributes. In RBAC,
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however, the insider attacker is likely to have access to a larger subset of health-
care information due to RBAC’s lack of granularity. Both ABAC and BLAC utilize
attributes and policies, all of which must be satisfied to grant access, thus reducing
the subset of healthcare information that can be threatened by the attacker.
6.3.2 Evaluating Access Control Models Against Improper Access Threat
Authorized healthcare providers may be able to perform improper operations over
healthcare information using their own credentials. Such improper access may be
possible as most healthcare applications that implement RBAC are typically regu-
lated using the role of healthcare providers. That is, once a set of healthcare providers
are assigned to a role, all providers assigned to this role will be assigned to the
same permission set.
Such an assignment does not take into account the providers’ involvement in
the treatment of each patient, as required by the HIPAA Privacy Rule [91]. In such
an RBAC setting, it is possible for healthcare providers to gain improper access.
Even the use of auditing mechanisms that may log such improper access is not
sufficient as improper access would have already occurred; the goal here must be
the prevention, not the subsequent detection.
Due to the fine granularity and high flexibility of ABAC and BLAC, the set of
healthcare information that providers can access is further constrained by various
attributes and a set of fine-grained access control policies. For example, when us-
ing the BLAC model, it is feasible to specify that healthcare providers can only
access health information of patients that these providers have direct treatment
relationships with. Also, access by emergency department providers can be lim-
ited to access requests within the hospital locations. Thus, the BLAC model would
significantly decrease the possibility of improper actions and the set of exposed
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healthcare information comparing to RBAC, due to the use of attributes and fine-
grained access policies.
In summary, the analysis shows the fine-grained features of both ABAC and
BLAC enable them to mitigate insider threats better than RBAC. Compared to
ABAC, BLAC has reduced complexity of access control evaluation, user revoca-
tion and user permission review as discussed in Chapter 5. Among these three
schemes, BLAC is shown to be the most effective access control approach for miti-
gating insider threats.
6.4 Chapter Summary
Access control mechanisms can often mitigate unauthorized access by external
subjects, i.e., outsiders, but it is more challenging to mitigate insider threats as
they already have some authority to access data in the system. This chapter de-
signed and constructed a threat model for access control to address the security
objective of minimizing unauthorized and improper use, disclosure, modification,
and destruction of patient health information by insiders.
The constructed model was used to identify two insider threats: unauthorized
access and improper access of health information by healthcare providers. Al-
though a healthcare application was used for demonstration, the threat model con-
structed here and the identified threat can be applied to other domain areas.
The threat model constructed in this chapter was then used to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of current access control models, RBAC, ABAC and BLAC. The anal-
ysis indicated that ABAC and BLAC mitigate insider threats better than RBAC.





This chapter concludes this dissertation and discusses several possible future re-
search directions.
7.1 Conclusion
This dissertation investigated the use of attributes and policies in the design of
effective access control models to address the problem of improving access control
models while maintaining the advantages of RBAC.
The dissertation presented an access control design using CP-ABE that pro-
vided effective solutions to some of the issues related to standard access control
mechanisms. It also explored the viability of adopting CP-ABE in terms of time
and storage overhead. The results suggested that the proposed design would pro-
vide promising performance and consume trivial storage, and thus CP-ABE can be
used to enforce access control.
The dissertation also proposed the BLAC model, which is a central contribution
of this work. The BLAC model uses pseudoroles and BLAC polices to perform a
two-step access control evaluation. The first step checks access requests to verify
whether requesting subjects have the pseudoroles specified in the BLAC policies of
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the requested objects. If requesting subjects hold the right pseudoroles, the second
step checks rule(s) within the associated BLAC policies for additional constraints
on access.
The dissertation then defined an evaluation framework to examine the perfor-
mance of the BLAC model. The framework consists of five core functions that are
used to evaluate access control models based on the time complexity. The results
of these evaluations are then used to compare the BLAC model against RBAC and
ABAC.
BLAC outperforms RBAC in terms of authorization decision-making and per-
mission modification, and performs comparably to RBAC in revocation. Due to the
use of policies in BLAC, however, RBAC outperforms BLAC in policy modification
and permission review. On the other hand, the BLAC model outperforms ABAC in
terms of authorization decision-making and revocation, and performs comparably
to ABAC in policy and permission modification and permission review.
The dissertation finally constructed a generic access-control threat model to an-
alyze the effectiveness of the BLAC model in mitigating insider threats and com-
pare it against RBAC and ABAC. The analysis shows that BLAC is able to decrease
unauthorized and improper access, with better performance.
7.2 Future Work
This dissertation provides an extensive investigation of the use of attributes and
policies in access control models. As a result of this dissertation, several useful
areas of research have been identified for further investigation, as described next.
A Large Scale Empirical Study of the BLAC Model
Although this dissertation validates the practical viability of BLAC by applying it
to the healthcare domain in Section 4.4 and evaluates its performance through a
102
7.2. FUTURE WORK
theoretical analysis with respect to the time complexity, an additional large-scale
empirical study can be further conducted.
A possible approach for the large-scale empirical study is to model access con-
trol models implemented in production systems, including RBAC, ABAC, and
BLAC, and then implement these models. Consequently, simulation scenarios us-
ing the models can be run and analyzed in terms of the functions identified in
Table 5.1.
Access Control In Big Data Systems
Another interesting area that builds on the work done in this dissertation is the ap-
plication of access control models to Big Data systems. In the past few years, such
systems including Apache Hadoop [87] and Cassandra [86] have become critical in
a world of exponentially increasing information. In order to comply with various
privacy acts and regulations such as HIPAA [94], access to such information needs
to be controlled.
These big data systems, however, do not support access control, whether it
is coarse-grained or fine-grained. These systems thus suffer from all of the limi-
tations discussed throughout this dissertation. An investigation of access control
issues using RBAC, ABAC, and especially BLAC, in big data systems seems worth-
while.
Logical Evaluation Framework for Access Control
This dissertation discussed the need for a framework to compare various access
control models. Due to the lack of work in this space, this dissertation presented
an evaluation framework that allows comparing access control models based on
the algorithmic efficiency considering the time complexity. This work leads to an-




Access control models have more elements beyond efficiency that need to be
captured. These elements may include the level of granularity and the ease of
development. Thus, a logical evaluation framework for assessing these factors is
worth exploring.
The Integration of the BLAC Model and CP-ABE
The BLAC model is designed to use attributes and policies for making access de-
cisions in a linear manner with respect to the number of attributes used. CP-ABE,
on the other hand, uses attributes and policies to encrypt data and associates en-
crypted data with policies defining who can decrypt it.
A framework for integrating or combining BLAC and CP-ABE is worth investi-
gating, because the integrated approach is likely to result in more secure and more
flexible systems via combining the access control and encryption mechanisms. The
integrated framework is likely to perform comparably to BLAC and CP-ABE or
better.
Privacy-Preserving in the BLAC Model
A critical issue related to this dissertation is privacy preservation in attribute-based
access control models in general and in BLAC specifically. This issue is motivated
by the fact that various kind of attributes used in making access requests and poli-
cies may reveal private information [55,78]. In the BLAC model, attributes of a re-
quested object and requester are sent to the Access Decision Engine, usually hosted
in a remote server provider, for evaluation. Access policies are also stored in a re-
mote server provider. Thus, the BLAC model is vulnerable to such threats.
Attributes and access policies must be protected to ensure preserving two main
privacy properties: requester anonymity and relationship anonymity [80]. In the
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BLAC model, requester anonymity guarantees the difficulty of determining the
identities of access requesters. Relationship anonymity, on the other hand, ensures
the separation of access requesters and requested objects.
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